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I Introduction
Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act)' to arm the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) with a broader arsenal of procedural and
remedial weapons than it had previously possessed in order to facilitate the
Commission's function of enforcing the federal securities laws.2 In so doing,
however, the legislators inadvertently created a new form of substantive
liability for "causing" any other person or entity to violate any of these statutes
and regulations.' The Remedies Act states in relevant part:
1. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429,104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. See Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Hardball! The SEC's New Arsenal of Enforcement
Weapons, 47 Bus. LAW. 33, 33 (1991) (explaining purpose of Remedies Act); infra text
accompanying note 13 (reciting new remedies such as cease-and-desist orders and civil
monetary penalties). For a general description of the SEC and the statutes it administers, see
I Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURTmES REGULATION 224-318 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1998).
The SEC's Division of Enforcement files civil and administrative lawsuits against persons and
companies that engage in fraudulent activities (such as insider trading, market manipulation, and
drafting misleading financial and proxy statements) and nonfraudulent, but nonetheless illegal,
conduct (such as corporate reporting and recordkeeping violations, broker-dealer misconduct,
and improper registration of securities). See infra Part ILI.D (discussing types of securities law
violations); infra note 7 and accompanying text (describing SEC enforcement mandate). See
generally 2 MATTRHEw BENDER & Co., FEDERAL SEcuRlrEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 9.02
(4th ed. 2002) (providing overview of SEC enforcement regime). Any person may be liable for
"causing" any other person to engage in any of these violations. See infra Part I.D (discussing
applicability of causing liability to various violations); infra note 19 and accompanying text
(noting breadth of causing liability statutes).
3. See Steven W. Hansen, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of Cease and
DesistAuthority: A PreliminaryAppraisal, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 343 (1993) (observing that
"the [Remedies Act] cease-and-desist provisions may indirectly change the reach of the
substantive securities laws" by means of "causing" liability); Bruce A. Hiler & Neil K. Oilman,
The SEC's Use oflts Cease-and-DesistAuthorit: A Survey, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 235,239 (1995)
("Although the cease-and-desist authority is widely viewed as a remedies provision, it, in effect,
creates a new category of secondary liability under the securities laws through the language of
the provisions authorizing an action against any person who is a 'cause' of another's viola-
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If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any
person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this
title, or any rule or regulation thereunder, the Commission may publish its
findings and enter an order requiring suchperson, and any other person that
is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the
person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation, to
cease and desist from committing or causing such violation and any future
violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation.4
Surprisingly, the scope of this "causing" liability has remained largely
undefined for over ten years.' In fact, the Commission began to delineate its
essential elements only two years ago.6 Thus, the purposes of this Note are to
explain the relatively slow development of causing liability, to analyze how
and why the Commission began to define it, to propose reasonable solutions
for the definitional controversies that remain, and to describe why causing
liability is becoming an increasingly important weapon for the enforcement of
securities laws.
The creation and initial growth of causing liability is attributable to the
manner in which the Remedies Act altered the SEC enforcement program. The
SEC exercises its duty to enforce the federal securities laws in two ways: by
filing civil actions in federal district court and by instituting administrative
enforcement proceedings before administrative law judges (ALJs).7 However,
tion."); Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427, 465 (2001) ("The Com-
mission could conceivably use that wording ['causing' violations] to create new types of
secondary liability....").
4. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 § 203, Pub.
L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at Securities Act of 1933 § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a)
(2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); Investment
Company Act of 1940 § 9(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f)(1) (2000); Investment Advisers Act of
1940 § 203(kXl), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(kXl) (2000)) (emphasis added). The Remedies Act
amended four major federal securities statutes to provide the cease-and-desist order as a remedy
for violating or causing a violation of each. See William R. McLucas et al., SEC Enforcement:
A Look at the Current Program and Some Thoughts About the 1990s, 46 Bus. LAW. 797, 832
(1991) (noting four provisions).
5. See Stephen J. Crimmins & Mitchell E. Herr, SEC Resolves Long-Standing Questions
AboutIts Cease-and-DesistRemedy, 33 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1084,1084 (July 23, 2001)
(noting "long-standing questions" and "considerable uncertainty" surrounding causing liability
and cease-and-desist orders from 1990 until 2001).
6. See infra Parts 1I[.C.3 & III.E.I (discussing KPMG Peat MarwickLLP, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket 384 (Jan. 19, 2001), petitionfor review denied, 289 F.3d
109 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
7. See 2 MATHEW BENDER& CO., supra note 2, § 9.02[1]-[2] (distinguishing two types
of SEC enforcement actions). The SEC Rules of Practice contain the procedural requirements
for both Commission and ALJ hearings. SEC Rules of Practice 110-490, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.110-490 (2002); see also 2 MATrEW BENDER & Co., supra note 2, § 9.02[2][d]
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the remedies available to the Commission have varied over time and continue
to vary based on the type of enforcement proceeding. Before 1990, the SEC
primarily relied on its civil enforcement power, which allowed it to seek
injunctions' and ancillary equitable relief' from federal courts for any type of
securities law violation. Later legislative enactments gave the SEC the right
to ask federal courts to impose civil monetary penalties for insider trading. 0
In contrast, the Commission reserved the administrative forum for disciplinary
actions against regulated securities professionals like broker-dealers, invest-
ment advisers, and their associates, as well as accountants and attorneys." The
remedies in these cases were limited to censure, registration suspension or
(surveying rules). The SEC does not engage in criminal prosecution of securities law violations,
but it does refer egregious cases to the Department of Justice for that purpose. See Margaret V.
Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and CriminalEnforcement ofFederaiRegulatory Statutes: The Case
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. 1LU. L. REV. 1025, 1026-27, 1040-41 (stating
that Exchange Act is "hybrid statute" providing for civil and criminal enforcement); infra note
8 (listing injunction provisions that also provide for criminal referrals). Securities litigation
instituted by private plaintiffs also plays an important enforcement role, but Congress has not
been receptive to it recently. See Bradley R. Aronstam, Note, The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 's Paradigm ofAmbiguity: A Circuit Split Ripe for Certiorari, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1061, 1061-62, 1068-70 (2000) (recounting problems with private securities suits that
prompted major legislative response). This Note will not focus on private actions because only
the SEC can utilize causing liability under its cease-and-desist authority. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000) (stating only that Commission
may enter causing liability orders).
8. See Morrissey, supra note 3, at 439 & n.78 (citing following injunction provisions
of federal securities laws: Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(dXl) (2000); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 18(e),
15 U.S.C. § 79r(e) (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 42(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d)
(2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (2000)). Injunctions
were the SEC's first enforcement tool. Id. at 439-40.
9. See Gary Langan Goodenow, Litigating the SEC 's Ancillary Enforcement Remedies
Following Central Bank and Its Progeny, 21 AM. J. TRIALADvOC. 67,67,71 (1997) (observing
that courts created remedies of disgorgement asset freezes, and receiver appointments pursuant
to equity jurisdiction because federal securities statutes did not expressly provide them for SEC
civil enforcement actions). But see infra note 133 (citing recent codification of ancillary
equitable remedies).
10. See Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the
1990 Remedies Act: CivilMoney Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 8 & n.23, 9 & n.30 (1994)
(citing Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat 1264 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
11. See McLucas et al., supra note 4, at 830 (noting that traditional SEC administrative
power was only over regulated persons); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 464 (same); infra note 48
(giving relevant statutes).
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revocation, activity limitations, and denial of the ability to practice before the
Commission."
However, by amending various provisions of the federal securities laws,
the Remedies Act expanded SEC enforcement authority along numerous fronts
by allowing the Commission to:
(1) [s] eek civil penalties for (a) violations of the securities statutes and rules
and regulations thereunder, other thanviolations involving insider trading,
and (b) violations of cease-and-desist orders in federal district court;
(2) impose monetary penalties and enter orders requiring an accounting and
disgorgement in administrative proceedings against regulated entities such
as broker-dealers, investment advisers and their associated persons;
(3) issue cease-and-desist orders against anyperson, and order respondents
in such proceedings to account for and disgorge ill-gotten gains; (4) issue
temporary cease-and-desist orders against regulated entities; and (5) seek
orders from federal district courts prohibiting persons from serving as
officers and directors of reporting companies if the person has violated
certain antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and ifthe person's
conduct demonstrates a lack of fitness.'
3
Thus, the Remedies Act permitted the SEC for the first time to bring adminis-
trative enforcement actions seeking to order any person to refrain permanently
(or "cease and desist") from violating or causing a violation of any statute or
regulation and to return any illicit proceeds to the Commission for distribution
to injured parties. 4 Most commentators correctly predicted that the SEC
would quickly begin taking advantage of this new remedial flexibility to try
less serious cases, including those involving causing liability, before ALJs.15
Nevertheless, the early adjudication of causing liability cases occurred
without a corresponding development of the law governing causing liability.
Moreover, although commentators have thoroughly analyzed most aspects of
12. See Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New
Remedies vs. Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 537, 548 (1997) (reviewing remedies against
attorneys); McLucas et al., supra note 4, at 830 (reviewing remedies against broker-dealers and
investment advisers).
13. Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 33-34 (emphasis added). Congress passed the Reme-
dies Act out of frustration with the inflexibility of traditional equitable remedies for combating
securities fraud. Id. at 35-36. Such remedies were simultaneously ineffective deterrents in
some cases and drastically harsh penalties in others. Id. For a comparison of cease-and-desist
orders with injunctions, see infra Part 1II.C.2.
14. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 348-49 (reviewing new remedies under Remedies Act).
15. See Crimmins & Herr, supra note 5, at 1084 ("Over the last decade, cease-and-desist
proceedings have become an important enforcement tool for the Commission and are now a
substantial portion of its enforcement docket."); infra notes 16, 19, 23 (reviewing commenta-
tors' concerns about breadth and increased use of both cease-and-desist orders and causing
liability).
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the Commission's cease-and-desist authority under the Remedies Act,' 6
causing liability has remained relatively untouched. Initial scholarly critique
of the Remedies Act simply overlooked causing liability 7 as the newest form
of "secondary" liability for securities law violations; 8 that is, liability for
somehow assisting another person or entity's violation, as opposed to "pri-
mary" liability for violating the text of a statute oneself. Later studies noted
the uncertain and possibly large breadth of causing liability but, given the
paucity of judicial and administrative materials addressing the subject, gave
it rather cursory treatment.'9 The Commission itself precipitated this dearth of
16. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 58-59 (expressing concern over breadth of power
to order compliance, despite fact that cease-and-desist authority would reduce litigation over
collateral consequences of injunctions); Hansen, supra note 3, at 347-53 (surveying SEC's use
of cease-and-desist authority and debating propriety of not requiring showing of likely future
violations in cease-and-desist proceedings); Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 237-40 (address-
ing concerns that SEC would use lax procedural and evidentiary rules of administrative
proceedings to bring marginal cases and create new law by enforcement rather than
mlemaking); John F.X. Peloso & Elizabeth A. Corley, The SEC's Cease-and-Desist Powers,
26 REv. SEC. & COMMODrrmEs REG. 11, 15-16 (1993) (finding that SEC is using cease-and-
desist orders as additional, not alternative, remedies); John Marshall Cook, Comment, The
Securities Enforcement and Penny StockReform Act of1990: The Cost ofFlexibility, 6 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 359, 385-86 (1992) (downplaying claims that broader cease-and-desist orders will
replace injunctions and that ALJs are not sufficiently impartial); David Franklin Levy, Com-
ment, The Impact of the Remedies Act on the SEC 'sAbility to Obtain Injunctive Relief, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 645, 678-84 (1994) (claiming that courts are less likely to grant SEC injunction
requests after Remedies Act because speedier administrative forum obviates pressing need for
equity powers and because cease-and-desist orders lack collateral consequences of injunctions).
17. See Cook, supra note 16, at 381-83 (failing to discuss causing liability); Matthew
Scott Morris, Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990: By Keeping Up with the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal Is Modernized, 7
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151, 163-64, 190-99 (1993) (same).
18. See Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank. Not Just the End
ofAiding andAbetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. R~v. 1387, 1392-93 (1995)
(distinguishing primary from secondary liability).
19. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 59-60 (noting that causing liability "raises con-
cerns" because legislative history is silent regarding its mental state requirement, but that SEC
is likely to use negligence standard); Hansen, supra note 3, at 343-47, 354-55 (reviewing scant
legislative history regarding causing liability and Commission's initial reluctance to extend
doctrine beyond aiding and abetting); Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 239, 266-68 (calling
causing doctrine "unclear and potentially extremely broad" and assessing dangers of SEC's
apparent preference for negligence standard); Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Adminis-
trative ActionsAgainst Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 Bus. LAW. 1293, 1307-09 (1995) (stating
that SEC has not resolved various issues regarding causing liability and that causing could be
broader and easier to prove than aiding and abetting); S. Scott Luton, The Ebb and Flow of
Section 10(b) Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Central Bank, 17 U. ARK. LTE ROCK L.J. 45,
67 (1994) (stating, without citing any authority, that causing liability encompasses negligent
conduct that would not constitute aiding and abetting); Maxey, supra note 12, at 570-78
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commentary by continually refusing to distinguish causing liability from the
other forms of secondary liability at its disposal.2" Eventually, however, the
judicial assault on these other theories during the late 1990s2" seemed to force
the Commission into its first examination of causing liability in January 2001,
when it defined the mental state requirement for causing liability in the case of
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP.22
Given that the SEC will likely use causing liability more frequently to
compensate for its loss of other secondary liability theories, 23 the time has
(showing that Commission is allowing its administrative law judges to impose causing liability
on attorneys without announcing definitive standards); McLucas et al., supra note 4, at 835
(noting that causing liability may apply to broader class of defendants than aiding and abetting,
but not discussing why); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 464-67 (noting "expansive language" of
causing liability, unfairness of its apparent negligence standard, and debate over recidivism
requirement); Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 17 (noting that while meaning of causing
"remains cloudy," SEC appears to be equating it with aiding and abetting); Bettina M. Lawton
& Catherine Botticelli, New Weapon in the SEC's Arsenal: Secondary Liability After Central
Bank, Bus. L. TODAY, July/August 1995, at 34 (suggesting that, despite lack of direct authority
interpreting causing liability, SEC will adopt negligence standard).
20. See infra Part HI.C.1 (discussing Commission's prevention of development of causing
liability law).
21. See infra Part I (discussing decline of secondary liability for securities law viola-
tions).
22. See infra Parts M.C.3 & III.E.] (discussing KPMG). KPMG may ultimately spark
greater academic interest in causing liability as well. See 3 THoMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURrTIS REGULATION § 16.5 (4th ed. 2002) (mentioning holding in KPMG Peat Marwick
LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket 384 (Jan. 19, 2001)); 1 MARc L.
STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIEs PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORcEMENT
§ 6:15 (2d ed. 2002) (mentioning holding in KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir.
2002), which affirmed Commission's holding regarding negligence standard); Annual Review
of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 Bus. LAW. 747, 895-99 (2003) (discussing D.C. Circuit's
holding in KPMG); Crimmins & Herr, supra note 5, at 1084-87 (discussing Commission's
holding in KPMG); Christian J. Mixter, Individual Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws for Misstatements in Corporate SEC Filings, 56 Bus. LAW. 967, 984 (2001) (noting, but
not discussing, Commission's holding in KPMG). See generally Dhaivat H. Shah, The Care
and Feeding of an SEC Cease-and-Desist Order: The Commission Defines Its Authority
Through In the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 271 (2002) (examin-
ing Commission's holding in KPMG).
23. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 59-60 (predicting that SEC will pursue more cases
administratively if causing liability requires only negligence, because aiding and abetting claims
in federal court require scienter); Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 238-39 (stating that causing
liability is "a valuable enforcement tool for the SEC" after Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank ofDenver, NA., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)); Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1309
(concluding that broad causing liability coupled with Central Bank holding will lead Commis-
sion to pursue more attorneys by administrative action for assisting securities law violations);
Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 39 (arguing that informal SEC statements suggest
causing liability is broader than aiding and abetting and will thus become increasingly important
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come for the Commission and the courts to define all of the basic elements
governing causing liability in order to provide a fair, effective, and predictable
basis for imposing permanent cease-and-desist orders on secondarily liable
persons. Towards this end, this Note will review the slow development of
causing liability and propose reasonable solutions for the controversies still
surrounding it. Part II briefly recounts the recent decline of other forms of
secondary liability for securities violations to illustrate the increasing impor-
tance of causing liability and thus the need for a clearer definition of its ele-
ments. 24 In the wake of KPMG, Part III discusses and attempts to resolve
current interpretive issues regarding causing liability by comparing it to the
similar but distinct concept of aiding and abetting. 2 These interpretive issues
include the required mental state for causing a primary violation that requires
scienter, 26 the degree of action required to trigger causing liability by contribut-
ing to another person's violation,27 and the necessary causal nexus between the
contributing act and the ensuing primary violation. 2  Finally, Part IV con-
cludes that causing liability is appropriately different from and easier to
establish than aiding and abetting liability.29 The Commission and the courts
should hold (1) that causing liability attaches to acts or omissions that are both
a factual and a legal cause of the secondary actor's contribution to the underly-
ing violation and (2) that, in most cases, the causing party need only act negli-
gently, regardless of whether the primary violation requires a higher mental
state.
II. The Decline of Secondary Liability
A. Aiding andAbetting
In the early 1990s, the SEC may not have felt the need to define causing
liability simply because it had so many other theories of secondary liability
after Central Bank); Richard M. Phillips, Soft Dollar Decision Raises Concerns Over SEC
Administrative Proceedings, INSIGHTS, Vol. 8, No. 7, at 2,2 (noting that defense bar celebration
over Central Bank might wane if Commission uses causing liability to reach aider-abettors by
administrative action); infra Part UI (discussing Central Bank and decline of secondary liability
generally). But see Morrissey, supra note 3, at 470-72 (claiming that congressional revival of
aiding and abetting for SEC actions after Central Bank will preserve use of injunctions against
rise of cease-and-desist orders).
24. See infra Part II (discussing decline of secondary liability generally).
25. See infra Part Iml (comparing causing liability with aiding and abetting).
26. See infra Part III.E.1 (examining degree of knowledge requirement for causing
liability).
27. See infra Part M.E.2 (examining degree of action for causing liability).
28. See infra Part M.E.3 (analyzing causal nexus for causing liability).
29. See infra Part IV (concluding that aiding and abetting liability differs from causing
liability in material respects).
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upon which it could rely.3" However, during the mid-1990s, the demise and
partial revival of aiding and abetting as a tenable theory of secondary liability
in securities litigation started a domino effect that continues to threaten the
SEC's ability to use other forms of secondary liability.3 Thus, the overall
decline of secondary liability removed a major impediment to defining
causing liability and paved the way for it to become the preferred form of
secondary liability for SEC enforcement actions.
Although the principal antifraud provision of the federal securities laws,
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),32 does
not expressly provide a right of action for private plaintiffs, courts had long
inferred that this right existed against both primary33 and secondary defen-
dants.34 Most federal courts also agreed on three basic elements for an aiding
and abetting claim: (1) someone other than the aider-abettor violated the text
of a federal securities law, (2) the aider-abettor had general awareness or
knowledge of the primary violation or his own improper conduct, and (3) the
aider-abettor provided substantial assistance to the primary violator.35
30. See infra Part ll.A-C (discussing various forms of secondary liability).
31. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1389 (doubting future of conspiracy and vicarious
liability claims).
32. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) (prohibiting
deceptive or manipulative acts in connection with purchase or sale of any security). Section
10(b) is executed by Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). See Goodwin,
supra note 18, at 1390 n.14 (noting role of Rule 10b-5).
33. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1391-92 & nn.16-21 (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976) (recognizing implied primary private right of action
under Section 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)
(same); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (same);
Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (same)). The Supreme
Court has consistently refused to reconsider whether an implied private right of action exists for
primary violations of Section 10(b). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,380
& n.10 (1983) ("The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
34. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1392-94 & nn.26-29 (reviewing cases from twelve
federal courts of appeals after 1966 acknowledging private action against aider-abettors).
However, the Supreme Court twice reserved the question of whether private aiding and abetting
actions existed under Section 10(b). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379
n.5 (1983) (reserving issue); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976) (same).
35. See David S. Ruder, The Future ofAidingandAbeting and Rule lOb-SAfter Central
Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAW. 1479, 1479-80 & n.4 (1994) (giving elements of aiding and
abetting and citing cases); Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1395 & n.32 (same). Despite the
common-law roots of aiding and abetting in tort and criminal law, courts differed on (1) whether
knowing inaction with an intent to assist could constitute substantial assistance absent a
fiduciary duty to disclose and (2) whether recklessness could satisfy both the Rule 1Ob-5 mental
state requirement for the primary violator and the awareness requirement for aiding and
abetting. See I HAZEN, supra note 22, § 7.13[1] (noting courts' slightly different approaches
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Despite this general agreement, in Central Bank of Denver, NA. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,36 the Supreme Court held that aiding and
abetting claims are untenable under Section 10(b) because Congress did not
explicitly provide for them in that text." Although Central Bank arose in the
context of private securities litigation and the majority opinion's language
seemed to confine this surprising holding to that realm,3" the dissenting Jus-
tices and commentators observed that the Court's textualist reasoning was
equally applicable to SEC enforcement actions based on aiding and abetting.39
Subsequently, many courts began dismissing SEC complaints based on aiding
and abetting liability, and even the Commission appeared to acquiesce to this
interpretation of Central Bank.40
to aiding and abetting); Ruder, supra, at 1484-85 & nn.25-27 (same); Goodwin, supra note 18,
at 1395-98 & nn.22, 36-42 (reviewing common-law roots and circuit differences).
36. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994). In Central Bank, the Court considered whether private civil liability under Section
10(b) extends to aider-abettors. Id. at 166-67. The case involved a claim by bondholders that
the issuer, its underwriters, and a real estate developer had intentionally misrepresented the
value of the real estate that secured the bonds. Id. at 167-68. The bondholders also claimed
that Central Bank of Denver, as the indenture trustee, had aided and abetted the fraud by
agreeing with the developer to delay an independent review of the appraisal until after the bond
issue. Id. at 168. Despite a Tenth Circuit finding that the plaintiffs had shown sufficient
recklessness and substantial assistance on the part of Central Bank to survive summary judg-
ment, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 168-69, 192. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that "[i]t is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend
liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text," regardless of whether
such an extension furthers the broad policy objectives of the federal securities laws. Id. at 177,
188. Rejecting other arguments based on legislative intent and subsequent reenactment or
acquiescence, the Court held that private plaintiffs may not maintain aiding and abetting claims
under Section 10(b). Id. at 179, 183-86, 191.
37. Id. at 191.
38. See id. at 167, 171, 191 (discussing issue and holding in terms of private plaintiffs);
Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1430-32 (1994) (calling
holding "unexpected" because Court had endorsed implied right of action for contribution under
Section 10(b) in 1993 and eleven courts of appeals had endorsed implied action for aiding and
abetting).
39. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The majority leaves little
doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and abettors in civil
enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-."); Seligman, supra note 38, at 1434-35
(citing language inAaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,691 (1980), for proposition that same construc-
tion of Section 10(b) applies regardless of whether plaintiff is SEC or private party). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's escalating assault on implied private actions in general under
the federal securities laws, see 9 Louis Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURTImS REGULATION
4312-39 (3d ed. 1992).
40. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1410 & n.125 (citing dismissed cases and remarks of
then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt that Commission would not litigate extension of Central
Bank to SEC actions given availability of other enforcement options); Christi Harlan, SEC Is
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That submissive attitude was short-lived, however. The SEC and its
political allies soon persuaded Congress to overrule part of the holding in
Central Bank by including a provision in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) restoring the Commission's ability to pursue
secondary defendants for aiding and abetting violations of the Exchange Act.41
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act reads:
For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph
(1) or (3) of section 21 (d) [of the Exchange Act] anyperson that knowingly
provides substantial assistance to anotherperson in violation ofaprovision
of[the Exchange Act], or of any rule or regulation issued under [the Ex-
change Act], shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the
same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided. 2
However, this aiding and abetting restoration provision contains two ambigu-
ities that courts very well may resolve against the SEC. First, by not defining
the term "substantial assistance" in the statute's text, Congress failed to inter-
vene in a longstanding judicial dispute as to whether inaction can satisfy this
element.43 Second, the insertion of the word "knowingly" into the statutory
definition may have resolved the issue of the level of scienter" required to aid
Voluntarily Dropping Charges in Certain Cases Due to High Court Ruling, WAILL ST. J., May
6, 1994, at C15 (reporting securities defense bar reaction to SEC acquiescence).
41. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standardfor Aiders and Abettors
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus. LAW. 1,3-4 (1996). The
legislation was a compromise, however, in that it did not restore the aiding and abetting action
for private plaintiffs. Id. at 7-8.
42. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000)
(emphasis added).
43. See Ruder, supra note 35, at 1484-85 & nn.25-26 (noting dispute and recommending
that, if Congress acts, it should not recognize inaction as substantial assistance without existence
of duty to disclose); Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1396-97 & nn.36-40, 1430-31 (noting dispute
and recommending legislative definition); infra note 222 (citing divided case law on this issue).
44. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 194 (1976) (defining
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" and holding that
private plaintiffs must show it to prove primary violations of Rule 1 Ob-5); see also Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (holding that SEC must also prove primary violator's scienter
in Rule lob-5 civil enforcement actions). The Supreme Court twice reserved the question of
whether a showing of recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for securities fraud under
Rule lob-5 and has yet to decide the issue. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5 (reserving issue);
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12 (same). Until 1995, most circuits held that recklessness
sufficed, but language in the PSLRA created circuit splits (and a deluge of commentary)
regarding the substantive scienter requirement and, more controversially, what facts plaintiffs
must plead to meet this requirement. See Christopher J. Hardy, Comment, The PSLRA's
Heightened Pleading Standard: Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 U.S.F. L.
REV. 565, 568-69 & nn.34-37 (2001) (outlining splits and citing cases and commentary).
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and abet a violation by trumping previous holdings by some courts that reck-
lessness sufficed in lieu of a knowing violation.45 To date, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is the only court that has endorsed this view.46
The Commission has maintained, both before and after the passage of the
PSLRA, that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for aiding and
abetting. 7 Thus, continuing litigation over the contours of aiding and abetting
liability after the PSLRA could make causing liability a more attractive en-
forcement option for the SEC, especially if courts eventually require the SEC
to prove the higher scienter standard of knowledge rather than recklessness.4"
Scienter requirements for primary violators and aider-abettors present two distinct issues,
however. Compare Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41 (analyzing latter) with Hardy, supra
(analyzing former).
45. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 5-8 & nn.27-31 (citing conflicting
cases on whether recklessness satisfies scienter for aiding and abetting and supporting view that
new statute mandates scienter requirement of actual knowledge with reasoning from text,
legislative history, and statutory purpose). Courts generally have defined recklessness in the
securities fraud context as "a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." Allan Horwich, The Neglected
Relationship ofMaterialityandRecklessness in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 55 Bus. LAW. 1023,
1024 & n. 10 (2000) (citations omitted).
46. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288 n.11 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Section 104, by its plain
terms, requires 'know[ledge]' as an element of aiding and abetting."); Maxey, supra note 12,
at 567 (stating that Ninth Circuit dicta stands alone).
47. See Mixter, supra note 22, at 983 (discussing SEC's position). The SEC has voiced
this position primarily through administrative proceedings based on willful aiding and abetting
by securities professionals. See Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (reiterat-
ing, in case involving willful aiding and abetting, that recklessness constitutes scienter); infra
note 48 (reviewing willful aiding and abetting statutes).
48. See supra note 23 (reviewing commentators' assessments of same possibility after
Central Bank). However, even after Central Bank, Section 20(e) is not the sole basis for aiding
and abetting charges. Other sections of the federal securities laws also expressly provide for
aiding and abetting liability, but only against securities professionals subject to extensive SEC
regulation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ l5(bX4), (6), 21B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4),
(6), 78u-2 (2000) (providing that Commission may penalize broker-dealers and their associates
in numerous ways (including fines, disgorgement, and registration revocation) for willfully
aiding or abetting violations of federal securities laws); Investment Advisers Act of 1940
§ 203(eX6), (f), (i), (j), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(eX6), (f), (i), (j) (2000) (providing likewise for
investment advisers); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(b)(3), (d), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
9(bX3), (d), (e) (2000) (providing that Commission may prohibit persons from holding certain
positions within investment companies if they have willfully aided and abetted violations); SEC
Rule of Practice 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(eXl) (2002) (stating that Commission may
censure or deny privilege of practicing before it to all persons (usually attorneys and accoun-
tants) who willfully aid and abet federal securities law violations, as well as accountants who
engage in negligent improper professional conduct); Seligman, supra note 38, at 1436-37
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B. Conspiracy
Federal judges have used the textualist reasoning of Central Bank to
restrict other forms of secondary liability in addition to aiding and abetting,
and this trend could lead to a greater role for causing liability in the SEC
enforcement program. For instance, courts had long recognized that a person
could be civilly liable for conspiring to commit securities fraud by agreeing to
provide substantial assistance to the primary violator in furtherance of the
violation. 9 Because Section 10(b) does not expressly provide a right of action
based on conspiracy, however, most courts and commentators now believe that
securities fraud conspiracy claims are no longer valid, at least for private
plaintiffs.50 The SEC has argued that the 1995 aiding and abetting provision
in the PSLRA re-establishes its right to use conspiracy liability in civil en-
(noting that, even after Central Bank, SEC retains statutory authority to pursue securities
professionals for aiding and abetting); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4C, 15
U.S.C.S. § 78d-3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (codifying Rule 102(e) via Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002). But see Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (2000)
(providing that SEC can seek to enjoin any person for aiding, abetting, counseling, command-
ing, inducing, or procuring any violation of Investment Advisers Act). Furthermore, criminal
liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud continues to exist after Central Bank under a
statute that forbids aiding and abetting any federal crime. See James D. Cox, Just Deserts for
Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 539 (1996) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000)).
In contrast, the Securities Act has never expressly provided for aiding and abetting
liability. 1 HAZEN, supra note 22, § 7.1311]. Before Central Bank, the SEC may have been
able to bring implied claims for aiding and abetting violations of Sections 5 and 17 of the
Securities Act, which prohibit unregistered offerings and fraudulent sales, respectively. Id.
§ 7.13[4]. However, even before CentralBank, neither the SEC nor private plaintiffs could use
aiding and abetting under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act because those sections
expressly state who may be liable under them. Id. § 7.13[2]. The textualist reasoning of
Central Bank seems to preclude the SEC from alleging aiding and abetting under Sections 5 and
17 now as well because they are implied claims. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A.
GABALDON, SECURIsS REGULATION 245 (4th ed. 1999) (suggesting SEC's loss of claims). But
see I HAZEN, supra note 22, § 7.13[4] (claiming that SEC can still allege aiding and abetting
of Section 5 and 17 violations). Therefore, after Central Bank, secondary liability under the
Securities Act is restricted to controlling person liability for private plaintiffs, willful aiding and
abetting by professionals for the SEC, and causing liability for the SEC.
49. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1411-13 & n.129 (citing cases). Aiding and abetting
does not require an agreement, however. See Lisa Klein Wager & John E. Failla, Central Bank
of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.-The Beginning of an End, or Will
LessLead to More?, 49 Bus. LAW. 1451, 1463 (1994) (noting this distinction between conspir-
acy and aiding and abetting). For a general discussion of conspiracy charges involving the
federal securities laws, see Cox, supra note 48, at 528-32.
50. See Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 841
(2d Cir. 1998) (citing numerous cases); Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1413-17 (giving reasons
for decline of conspiracy claims).
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forcement actions, but whether a significant number ofjurisdictions will agree
remains unclear.5"
C. Respondeat Superior and Controlling Person Liability
Citing language in the Central Bank dissent,52 commentators predicted
that the decision would also eliminate the ability of the SEC and private
plaintiffs to bring claims under the common-law doctrine of respondeat
superior, which held employers strictly liable for acts of securities fraud
committed by employees in the course of their employment." However, many
also believed that one of the few types of secondary liability to survive Central
Bank would be a more limited form of respondeat superior known as "control-
ling person" liability because the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and
the Exchange Act expressly provide for it. 4 Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder
51. Compare SEC v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 2d 361,364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that
retroactive application of new aiding and abetting provision preserves SEC's right to charge
conspiracy) with SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 897 F. Supp. 117, 119-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismiss-
ing conspiracy claim based on Central Bank's reasoning). But see Seligman, supra note 38, at
1435 (asserting that loss of conspiracy action means little because SEC seldom used it).
52. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511 U.S.
164, 200 & n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (predicting that decisions recognizing
respondeat superior actions for SEC and private plaintiffs "appear unlikely to survive the
Court's decision").
53. See Wager & Failla, supra note 49, at 1462-63 (stating that viability of respondeat
superior is questionable after Central Bank because text of Section 10(b) never mentions it);
Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1417-19, 1422 (defining respondeat superior and calling for
restrictions). But see Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially Imple-
menting the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under
Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1325 (1997) (arguing that courts should continue to
recognize respondeat superior liability for securities fraud based on nontextual considerations);
Seligman, supra note 38, at 1436 (arguing that importance of respondeat superior was minimal
given existence of controlling person liability and duty of broker-dealers to reasonably supervise
employees).
54. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability Under
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 Bus. LAW.
1, 1-2 (1997) (reiterating statement of Central Bank majority that existence of controlling
person liability shows that 1934 Congress knew how to provide for secondary liability in
statutory text when it so desired). Controlling person liability is narrower than respondeat
superior because the former has a good faith defense. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1421
(discussing good faith defense). Even before Central Bank, circuits were split as to whether
the controlling person statutes precluded respondeat superior actions, with a majority conclud-
ing they did not. See id. at 1419-20 & nn.168-70 (citing cases).
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shall also be liablejointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.55
Despite the firm textual basis of controlling person liability, however,
judicial interpretation of the provisions has been sparse and muddled.56 In fact,
one of the unresolved issues surrounding the doctrine involves a circuit split
over whether the SEC can even allege controlling person liability in its civil
enforcement actions, as plaintiffs have always done in private cases.57 How-
ever, even if the Commission can use this theory, controlling person liability
is a poor substitute for aiding and abetting because some assisting parties
outside of control relationships with the primary violator (for example, outside
directors and lenders) could escape liability.5"
D. Ramifications for Causing Liability
As it did with controlling person liability, Congress expressly created
causing liability by statute, so that particular form of secondary liability is safe
from the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank.59 However, the similari-
55. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2000). The controlling
person provision in Section 15 of the Securities Act contains slightly different language, but is
immaterial to this discussion because it only applies to violations of Sections 11 and 12 of that
Act, which create private rights of action unavailable to the SEC. See Lowenfels & Bromberg,
supra note 54, at 4-5 (explaining narrowness of Section 15).
56. See Loftus C. Carson 11, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Federal
SecuritiesActs, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 263,266-67 (1997) (faulting broad language, minimal
legislative history, and unwilling judges for poor state of controlling person law); Lowenfels
& Bromberg, supra note 54, at 32-33 (noting irony of Central Bank eliminating aiding and
abetting as "unpredictable" nontextual doctrine while text-based theory of controlling person
liability is equally "complex and confusing"). Contested issues include what constitutes
"control," what standard of care the controlling person must use to escape liability, and whether
controlling person liability requires an element of "culpable participation." See generally
Carson, supra (discussing these issues at length); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54 (same).
57. Compare SEC v. First Jersey See., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing Commission's right to use Section 20(a) because Exchange Act definition of "person" in 15
U.S.C. § 78c(aX9) (2000) includes government agencies) with SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,
1318 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that SEC cannot rely on Section 20(a) in injunctive enforcement
actions because provision "was meant to specify the liability of controlling persons to private
persons suing to vindicate their interests").
58. See Wager & Failla, supra note 49, at 1465 (explaining why controlling person
liability is poor substitute for aiding and abetting); see also Cox, supra note 48, at 532-36
(explaining why controlling person liability is poor substitute for conspiracy).
59. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 4 n.19 (noting secure statutory basis
of causing liability).
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ties between causing and controlling person liability do not end there. Confu-
sion, complexity, and conflicting adjudications stemming from broad statutory
language and scant legislative histories have hindered the development of
coherent bodies of law for both types of liability.60 This state of affairs need
not continue. For example, courts had long overlooked the distinction between
primary and secondary liability because the difference was immaterial if both
types of defendants were jointly and severally liable.6 However, after Central
Bank, efforts by private plaintiffs to recharacterize peripheral parties involved
in securities fraud as primary violators in order to avoid dismissal compelled
a judicial and scholarly re-examination of the difference between the two types
of liability, with commentators seemingly reaching a consensus earlier than the
courts.62
Central Bank may provide the catalyst to clarify the law of causing
liability as well. As commentators have suggested, courts will likely rule
against the SEC on at least some of the various disputes that arose after Central
Bank concerning the assorted forms of secondary liability.63 If the Commis-
60. See Jeffrey M. Steinberg, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No. 568, 68
SEC Docket 120, 121 (Sept. 11, 1998) ("Construing the 'knew or should have known' language
has been complicated by the omission of any statutory definition, the absence of any guidance
regarding the language in the legislative discussion, and the paucity of administrative decisions
from the Commission and the administrative law judges."); supra note 56 and accompanying
text (discussing tangled state of law for controlling persons). Some clear differences exist
between the two, however. For example, the SEC is the only party able to base claims on
causing liability, which is restricted to administrative proceedings, has identical foundations in
four federal securities laws, and lacks a good faith defense and a control element. See supra
notes 4, 7, 54, and text accompanying note 58 (establishing these facts).
61. See Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1437 ("During the thirty years that the cause of action
for aiding and abetting existed, courts gave little attention to the distinction between primary
and secondary liability because both classes of actors were jointly and severally liable for the
Section 10(b) violation.").
62. See Gareth T. Evans & Daniel S. Floyd, Secondary Liability Under Rule IOb-5: Still
Alive and WellAfter Central Bank?, 52 Bus. LAW. 13, 26, 33-34 (1996) (proposing bright line
test based on making representations); Amanda J. Aymond, Comment, You'd Better Watch
What They Say: An Examination of Primary Liability for Secondary Actors Under Section
10(b), 68 U. CiN. L. REv. 835, 860-61 (2000) (endorsing test based on creating misrepresenta-
tions); Rodney D. Chrisman, Note, "Bright Line," "Substantial Participation," or Something
Else: Who Is a Primary Violator Under Rule lOb-5?, 89 KY. L.J. 201,224-25 (2001) (propos-
ing modified bright line test); Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst Second-
ary Actors: Why the Second Circuit's "BrightLine"Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1607, 1608 (2000) (endorsing bright line approach). But see 9 Louis Loss & JOEL
SEUGMAN, SECURrrIESREGULATION698-702 (Supp. 2000) (discussing myriad judicial attempts
at sharpening distinction between primary and secondary liability).
63. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 11-12 (predicting that Section 20(e)
of Exchange Act will require scienter and substantial assistance elements of aiding and abetting
to scale upward to knowing violation and proximate causation, respectively); supra note 50 and
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sion no longer can bring civil enforcement actions in federal district court
based on conspiracy, respondeat superior, and controlling person liability and
must prove that alleged aider-abettors assisted primary violators with actual
knowledge of wrongdoing, then pursuing secondary defendants in administra-
tive proceedings for causing primary violations will become an even more
favored weapon for enforcing the federal securities laws.' Thus, a more
precise definition of what conduct triggers causing liability, and how the
elements of causing liability differ from their closest analogues under aiding
and abetting, is just as necessary as a brighter line between primary and sec-
ondary liability for securities fraud (and could, in turn, further clarify that
distinction). Part III seeks such a clarification of causing liability.
I. Defining Causing Liability
A. Method ofAnalysis
The best approach to defining causing liability is to distinguish it from the
form of secondary liability that it most resembles: aiding and abetting. Com-
mentators have analyzed causing liability in this fashion in the past by asking
whether a person who causes a violation is necessarily also an aider-abet-
tor-that is, are the two doctrines coterminous, or is one broader than the
other? 5 Among the various forms of secondary liability, causing liability most
resembles aiding and abetting liability because both require only a primary
violation, an assisting act or omission, and an accompanying mental state;
additional requirements, such as an agreement or control relationship, are
unnecessary.66 However, differences may exist between the two theories
regarding these elements, and if causing liability is easier to establish than
accompanying text (suggesting loss of conspiracy claim); supra note 53 and accompanying text
(suggesting loss of respondeat superior claim).
64. See supra Part IIA-C (suggesting these possibilities). But see supra note 48, infra
note 124, and accompanying text (discussing other statutory forms of secondary liability still
available after Central Bank).
65. See Hansen, supra note 3, at 343, 346, 354-56 (noting that whether one can cause
violation without aiding and abetting it is unclear, but that Commission apparently thinks so);
Lorne & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1308-09 (suggesting that causing liability may be broader
than aiding and abetting in multiple respects); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 36-37
(comparing causing liability with aiding and abetting liability). But see Peloso & Corley, supra
note 16, at 17 & n.31 (doubting that negligent conduct, insufficient for aiding and abetting,
could nonetheless cause violations).
66. See Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 36-37 (giving elements of causing
liability and aiding and abetting liability); supra note 49 (noting that, unlike conspiracy, aiding
and abetting does not require agreement); supra text accompanying note 58 (noting that aiding
and abetting does not require control relationship like controlling person liability and
respondeat superior).
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aiding and abetting, one would expect the Commission to shift prosecution of
secondary offenders to the administrative forum.67
Indeed, a comparison of the statutory text creating causing liability with
that creating (or, rather, restoring) aiding and abetting liability initially sug-
gests that the elements of causing liability are less demanding. Specifically,
the mental state and act requirements for aiding and abetting ("knowingly" and
"substantial assistance") appear to be more rigorous than those for causing
liability ("know or should have known" and "contribute")." To evaluate this
textual argument, this Note now proceeds to examine: (1) the history of
causing liability, (2) procedural and remedial differences between causing
liability and aiding and abetting liability stemming from the purpose of the
Remedies Act, (3) differences between the two theories based on their applica-
bility to different primary violations, and (4) recent cases interpreting the scope
of causing liability.
B. Historical Sources
1. Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act
Unfortunately, the history of causing liability provides little guidance to
anyone seeking to interpret the doctrine today. Apparently, Congress imported
the concept of causing liability into the Remedies Act from an existing statu-
tory source.69 Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act provides that:
Ifthe Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that any
person subject to the provisions of section 12, 13, 14, or subsection (d) of
section 15 of [the Exchange Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder has
failed to comply with any such provision, rule, or regulation in any material
respect, the Commission may publish its findings and issue an order requir-
ing such person, and any person who was a cause of the failure to comply
due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would
contribute to the failure to comply, to comply, or to take steps to effect
67. See Lorne & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1309 ("[T]he practical effect of a distinction
between 'causing' and aiding and abetting theories of liability inevitably would be to encourage
the SEC to file more administrative proceedings against secondary participants in securities
violations because the standard for obtaining relief on a 'causing' theory appears easier to
meet.").
68. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (giving
elements of aiding and abetting) with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-3(a) (2000)'(giving elements of causing liability).
69. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 59 (observing that Congress apparently derived
Section 21C(a) causing liability from Section 15(cX4)); Hansen, supra note 3, at 343 (same);
Maxey, supra note 12, at 571 (same). But see Jeffrey M. Steinberg, Administrative Proceedings
Rulings Release No. 568, 68 SEC Docket 120, 122 (Sept. 11, 1998) (noting that no legislative
report explicitly refers to borrowing from Section 15(cX4)).
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compliance, with such provision or suchrule or regulationthereunderupon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may
specify in such order.70
The Commission secured passage of Section 15(c)(4) in 1964 to force compa-
nies to correct inaccurate Exchange Act filings without having to pursue an
injunction." Again at the behest of the Commission, Congress added the
language on causing liability in 1984 to resolve uncertainty as to whether the
SEC could bring proceedings under that section against individual directors,
officers, or employees of a corporation who, as the corporeal agents of an
ethereal entity, had caused that entity's noncompliance by drafting or signing
the documents.72 Congress gave little attention to either the original statute or
the amendment, however, and none of the 1984 committee reports mention
anything about causing liability.73 Furthermore, the SEC settled all but four of
the 113 proceedings that it brought under Section 15(c)(4) between 1964 and
1990,74 so that "at the time of the enactment of the Remedies Act, there existed
only a limited gloss on the meaning of causing a violation."' I
That "limited gloss" came primarily from the SEC's controversial case
against George C. Kem, Jr.,76 in which an AU found that outside counsel for
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(cX4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(cX4) (2000) (emphasis
added).
71. See Report of the ABA 's Section ofBusiness Law TaskForce on SEC Section 15(c)(4)
Proceedings, 46 Bus. LAw. 253, 256-58 (1990) [hereinafterABA Report] (stating purpose for
Section 15(cX4)).
72. See id. at 260-62, 266 (stating purpose for 1984 amendments); see also Hansen,
supra note 3, at 343-44 (noting that individual respondents also needed to hold positions from
which they could make corrective filings).
73. ABA Report, supra note 71, at 258, 263. The insider trading amendments that
Congress passed along with the Section 15(cX4) revision received most of the publicity, and
the SEC's characterization of the change as a mere "technical" alteration of its existing authority
preempted opposition to the amendment. Id. at 263.
74. Id. at 260.
75. Hansen, supra note 3, at 344.
76. George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 24,648, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988), affd, Exchange Act Release No. 29,356,
50 S.E.C. 596 (1991). In Kern, an ALJ considered whether Kern, an attorney for and director
of the Allied Store Corporation (Allied), had "caused" the company to violate Exchange Act
Rule 14d-9(c) (within the meaning of Section 15(cX4)) by failing to amend promptly its
Schedule 14d-9, a required filing when a board of directors recommends to shareholders that
they should accept or reject a tender offer. Id. at 89,580-81 & nn. 2-3. Allied's CEO had
given Kern complete discretion over the necessity of amending the filing, and Kern chose not
to disclose that, in response to a hostile tender offer, Allied had (1) entered into negotiations for
an asset sale that would allow it to recapitalize and avoid a takeover, (2) subsequently agreed
in principle to a "white knight" merger to avoid the hostile takeover, and (3) then adopted a
board resolution directing management to execute the merger. Id. at 89,580-82, 89,584-87.
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the target company of a hostile tender offer had caused the target to violate
Exchange Act Rule 14d-9(c)" by failing to amend a Schedule 14D-9 filing
promptly. 78 This failure amounted to negligence, which the AU held (as a
matter of first impression) satisfied the mental state requirement of Section
15(c)(4).79 The ALJ rejected Kern's argument for a recklessness standard on
two grounds: (1) a lower threshold was consistent with the section's legislative
purpose of providing rapid corrective disclosure to investors rather than
enforcing specific Exchange Act provisions, 0 and (2) the phrase "knew or
should have known" need not require the same level of scienter in every
context.8'
However, the AU discontinued the proceedings because Kern no longer
served the company after it became a wholly owned subsidiary, and thus he
did not have the power to correct the omission, which is the only remedy that
Section 15(c)(4) provides.82 The Commission affirmed the lack of a remedy
against Kern but expressed no opinion on the negligence standard, thus
Kern argued that Section 15(c)(4) required proof of at least recklessness, but the ALJ concluded
that the language "knew or should have known" connoted a negligence standard. Id. at
89,591-92. Finding the issue to be one of first impression, the AL reasoned that a higher
standard would frustrate the section's primary purpose of quickly providing accurate disclosures
to investors (rather than enforcing the federal securities laws). Id. at 89,591. Furthermore, the
liability standard of Section 15(cX4) did not need to match those of other securities laws (such
as aiding and abetting Section 10(b) violations); Congress knew how to create differing
standards by using different language when it so desired, as evinced by other provisions. Id.
at 89,591-92. Although finding that Kern had breached his duty of care, the ALJ discontinued
the proceedings against him after deciding that ordering compliance was the only remedy
available under Section 15(c)(4) and that Kern was no longer in a position to make a corrective
filing or control Allied's future compliance. Id. at 89,592, 89,595. The Commission affirmed
the dismissal on the remedy issue and expressed no opinion on the negligence standard. George
C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, 50 S.E.C. 596, 601-02 (1991).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(c) (2002).
78. Kern, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 89,580.
79. Id. at 89,591 ("[It is concluded that a showing of negligence by a person contributing
to a failure to comply is sufficient to satisfy the phrase 'should have known' in Section
15(cX4).").
80. Id.
81. Id. Kern argued that aiding and abetting a violation of Section 10(b) required at least
recklessness and that causing liability under Section 15(cX4) was more demanding than aiding
and abetting. Id. However, the ALJ maintained that the meaning of the phrase "knew or should
have known" is "flexible, varying with the context in which the question arises," and that
Congress knew how to impose higher standards by not using this language. See id. at
89,591-92 (citing language of "willful aiding and abetting" in Exchange Act Section
15(b)(4)(E) as more indicative of recklessness standard).
82. Id. at 89,581, 89,595.
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leaving the state of causing liability law ill-defined. 3 Nevertheless, one
commentator has suggested that the Commission may have intended to imply
a negligence standard by not withdrawing the ALJ's findings, while simulta-
neously preventing an appellate reversal by not imposing a sanction.84
In the time between the two Kern decisions, the American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on Section 15(c)(4) Proceedings (Task Force) also attempted
to clarify the meaning of causing liability under that provision in two ways.85
First, the Task Force examined what degree of participation or involvement
the Commission should require to establish a causal nexus between a person's
act or omission and the failure of the entity to comply with the applicable
securities laws. 6 Congress had overlooked this issue as well, but a colloquy
between then Commissioner James Treadway and Enforcement Division
Director John Fedders at a 1984 SEC open meeting illustrates an early inter-
pretation of the phrase "a cause of the failure to comply."8" In response to
Treadway's inquiries, Fedders explained that he believed causing liability
entailed a higher causation standard than aiding and abetting because, in
addition to being a "but for" cause of the failure to comply, an individual
would have to be the "person directly responsible" for causing the entity's
misstatement or omission.8 The Task Force agreed with this view and stated
that merely providing "substantial assistance" to an entity, as required for
aiding and abetting, should be insufficient to establish Section 15(c)(4)
causing liability; such liability should, as a matter of policy, require not just
factual but also legal causation, which Fedders's definition would ensure.89
The Task Force recommended that the Commission not view ministerial tasks
as significant acts or omissions; so, to use the Task Force's example, a mes-
senger could not cause an issuer to file a false form with the SEC (even
though his participation would be a "but for" cause of the improper filing), but
could cause the issuer to fail to file the form at all.9°
Second, the Task Force re-examined one of the issues addressed by the
ALJ in Kern: the mental state requirement of the phrase "knew or should
83. See George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, 50 S.E.C. 596, 601-02
(1991) ("M[We affirm solely the law judge's determination to discontinue these proceedings and
reach none of the other matters addressed therein.").
84. See Maxey, supra note 12, at 554-55 (noting this possibility).
85. See ABA Report, supra note 71, at 255-56 (describing Task Force's mission).
86. See id. at 277 (examining issue of causal nexus).
87. See id. at 276-77 (discussing exchange between Treadway and Fedders).
88. See id. at 277 (explaining Fedders's view of causation standard).
89. See id. at 278-79 ("The conduct that 'caused' the failure to comply ordinarily must
constitute a violation of a legal duty as well.").
90. See id. at 279 (stating why ministerial acts should not suffice to establish causing
liability).
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have known" in Section 15(c)(4). 91 Citing the lack of a statutory definition,
legislative discussion, or administrative case law other than Kern, the Task
Force members felt compelled to follow the AL's conclusion that Congress
intended to use a negligence standard based on the ordinary meaning of the
phrase "should have known."9 The Task Force reasoned that both Supreme
Court decisions in other contexts93 and leading authorities on tort law94
buttressed this interpretation as the plain meaning. 95 However, statutory
construction aside, the Task Force still maintained that, as a matter of policy,
the Commission should not use the full power that Congress had given it in
this case and should only institute Section 15(c)(4) proceedings against
persons who cause violations intentionally or recklessly. The Task Force's
reasons for this policy included protecting individuals from career-damaging
public stigma (from which entity violators are immune) and preventing
circumvention of the recklessness standard in SEC Rule of Practice 102(e)
disciplinary proceedings against securities attorneys and accountants.'
2. Legislative History of the Remedies Act
Prior to the enactment of the Remedies Act, the "any person" language
of Section 15(c)(4) provided virtually the only way for the Commission to
91. See id. at 280-85 (examining mental state requirement or standard of culpability).
92. See id. at 280-81 (approving Kern's negligence standard as consistent with congres-
sional intent).
93. See Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 169 & n.16 (1981)
(characterizing phrase "knew or should have known" in context of longshoremen's compensa-
tion statute as "cast in terms of negligence rather than unseaworthiness"); Gallick v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 118 (1963) (reciting jury instructions in Federal Employers'
Liability Act case as defining negligence in terms of reasonable foreseeability or what "in the
light of the facts then known, should or could reasonably have been anticipated").
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284(a) (1965) ("Negligent conduct may
be ... an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreason-
able risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another. . . .") (emphasis added); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175 (5th ed. 1984)
("[N]egligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do 'under the same or similar
circumstances."') (emphasis added).
95. See ABA Report, supra note 71, at 281 & nn. 132-34 (citing these sources).
96. See id. at 282 (stating Task Force's policy recommendations on use of causing
liability).
97. See id. at 282-85 (explaining Task Force's reasoning); supra note 48 (explaining Rule
102(e)). However, the SEC has since amended Rule 102(e) to encompass negligent improper
professional conduct by accountants. See SEC Rule of Practice 102(e), 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.102(eXlXiv) (2002) (punishing single instances of highly unreasonable conduct and
repeated instances of unreasonable conduct by accountants). Moreover, while entities do not
have "careers" as such, they certainly are not immune from bad publicity.
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bring administrative proceedings against individuals not regularly involved
in the securities industry.9 But Congress and the SEC had limited this power
in three important ways. First, only violations of Sections 12-15 of the
Exchange Act (and the rules thereunder) could give rise to Section 15(c)(4)
causing liability, so individuals could not be liable for causing Section 10(b)
securities frauds.99 Second, Congress never intended the section to be an
enforcement tool because, as indicated by the Commission's opinion in Kern,
the only remedy that Section 15(c)(4) provides is an order to correct fil-
ings-the SEC could not order prospective relief. 0 Finally, because of the
foregoing limitations, the SEC used Section 15(c)(4) to pursue only individu-
als who caused an entity to violate a securities law; a person could not cause
another person's violation under that provision.1°1
Because of these limitations, the Commission petitioned Congress in
1989 to amend Section 15(c)(4) and enhance its potential as an enforcement
weapon by permitting, among other things, the imposition of civil monetary
penalties under that section.102 Congress did not act on the proposal, but one
year later newly appointed SEC Chairman Richard Breeden proposed that
Congress give the SEC the power to issue administrative cease-and-desist
orders instead of amending Section 15(c)(4).103 This proposal was the progen-
itor of the Remedies Act, ° but because the SEC did not submit the statutory
language to Congress until after all the committee hearings on the subject,
98. See Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 237-38 (stating role of Section 15(cX4) prior
to Remedies Act); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 464 (same); see also McLucas et al., supra note
4, at 830-31 (noting Securities Act Section 8(d) stop orders and Section 120) registration
revocation as only other options).
99. See 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURImS AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 20:23 (2d ed. 2002) (noting limitation to Sections 12-15); William R.
McLucas & Laurie Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(c)(4) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 145, 149 (1985) (noting Section 10(b) exclu-
sion).
100. See 3D BLOOMENTHAL& WoLFF, supra note 99, § 20:23 (noting lack of penalty under
Section 15(cX4)); Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 237 (discussing Section 15(c)(4) remedies
under Kern).
101. See ABA Report, supra note 71, at 266 (noting that SEC used Section 15(cX4) against
individuals only fifteen times, all of which were against directors, officers, or employees of
entities whose compliance failures they had allegedly caused).
102. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 38 (giving details of 1989 proposal).
103. See id. at 38-39 (discussing 1990 proposal); Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at
13-14 (discussing 1989 and 1990 proposals); see also Hansen, supra note 3, at 340 (noting that
SEC told Congress in 1989 that it "neither needed nor wanted" cease-and-desist authority
because Section 15(cX4) was sufficient).
104. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 34-42 (summarizing legislative history of Remedies
Act); Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 13-14 (same).
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meaningful debate on the Act was practically nonexistent.' Specifically,
neither the House nor the Senate report on the Remedies Act even mentions
the concept of causing liability or its possible negligence standard.'0 6 Thus,
"despite the uncertainty surrounding the concept of liability for causing a
violation under Section 15(c)(4), Congress employed virtually identical
language in the Remedies Act without discussion. '"I"
The Commission has not initiated a Section 15(c)(4) proceeding since
1990 because, unlike that section, the Remedies Act clearly provides for
prospective relief via cease-and-desist orders."° Thus, the Commission now
uses the Remedies Act in lieu of Section 15(c)(4). Nevertheless, several
commentators have suggested that, unless courts can somehow assign differ-
ent meanings to the identical causing liability language in Section 15(c)(4)
and the Remedies Act, they should view Kern's negligence standard as
governing the new form of causing liability as well."° However, several
considerations counsel against this method of interpreting causing liability
under the Remedies Act exclusively by textual comparison to Section
15(c)(4). First, the ALJ's decision in Kern does not bind the Commission or
even other ALJs regarding the proper interpretation of Section 15(c)(4) or the
Remedies Act."' Second, Kern only addressed the mental state requirement
of causing liability under Section 15(c)(4) and thus provides only limited
guidance on other causing liability issues."' Finally, a purely textual compar-
ison ignores the AL's observation in Kern that the phrase "knew or should
105. See Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 14 (stating that debate suffered because of late
draft submission).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 101-616 (1990) (omitting discussion of causing liability), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379; S. REP. No. 101-337 (1990) (same); Ferrara et al., supra note 2,
at 59 (noting omission of causing liability from reports); Hansen, supra note 3, at 345 & n.25
(same).
107. Hansen, supra note 3, at 345.
108. See Hiler & Oilman, supra note 3, at 238, 240 n.15 (noting that, unlike Section
15(c)(4), Remedies Act expressly permits SEC to issue orders directing future compliance,
which explains decline of Section 15(cX4)).
109. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 59-60 (observing that SEC is likely to take position
that negligence suffices for causing liability based on similar statutory language in Section
15(c)(4) and Remedies Act); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34,38-39 (same); see also
Hansen, supra note 3, at 346 (stating that SEC can allege causing liability based on negligence
unless courts interpret two statutes differently).
110. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that Commission expressed no
opinion in Kern regarding negligence standard); infra notes 149, 187, and accompanying text
(discussing cases in which ALJs disagreed with conclusions of law expressed in prior initial
decisions of other ALJs).
111. See infra Part MI.C.3 (examining issue of further showing for prospective relief); infra
Part III.E.2 (examining issue of degree of action required for causing liability); infra Part lIl.E.3
(examining issue of causal nexus).
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have known" need not have the same meaning under every enforcement
provision of the Exchange Act; rather, its meaning should be "flexible,
varying with the context in which the question arises.""'
The Remedies Act provides a much different context for causing liability
than does Section 15(c)(4). First, it applies the concept to four different
statutes rather than four sections of one statute,"1 I thus encompassing a much
wider variety of violations. Second, Congress passed the Remedies Act for
enforcement and deterrence reasons in addition to the disclosure rationale of
Section 15(c)(4)." 14 Therefore, an inquiry into the proper standards governing
causing liability under the Remedies Act should not be tied to the text of or
the policies supporting the forgotten Section 15(c)(4). s Rather, as this Note
contends, the most productive approach for analyzing causing liability is to
compare it to aiding and abetting liability."6 Therefore, given the scant
legislative history surrounding causing liability, the remainder of this Note
will examine the possible differences between causing liability and aiding and
abetting liability primarily by analyzing legislative purpose and administrative
and judicial case law." 7
112. George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 24,648, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,342, at 89,591 (Nov. 14,1988), aff'd, Exchange Act Release No.
29,356, 50 S.E.C. 596 (1991); see Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 38 (stating that
ALJ's comment "mudd[ies] the waters" of analogy between causing liability under Section
15(c)(4) and Remedies Act).
113. See supra note 4 (giving applicability of Remedies Act causing liability); supra notes
99-101 and accompanying text (giving Section 15(cX4) applicability).
114. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 33 (stating that Remedies Act meant to increase
deterrence); Hansen, supra note 3, at 346 n.26 (explaining that disclosure philosophy of Section
15(c)(4) arguably applies to any ongoing violation depriving investors of material information);
Cook, supra note 16, at 360 (stating that Remedies Act has punitive, not remedial, focus).
115. See Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 267 (maintaining that AL's reliance on
legislative purpose rather than statutory text limits value of Kern for interpreting causing
liability under Remedies Act). The Commission did in fact rely on Kern and a textual compari-
son with Section 15(c)(4) to support its eventual finding of a negligence standard for causing
liability under the Remedies Act. See infra text accompanying note 194 (noting Commission's
argument that Congress incorporated negligence standard into Remedies Act by adopting
"causing" language from Section 15(cX4)). However, the Commission did not rely solely on
this factor in making its decision. See infra text accompanying notes 188-93 (discussing
Commission's four other justifications for negligence standard).
116. See supra Part Ifl.A (describing method of analysis).
117. Commentators have criticized the Commission for using its settlement orders, which
contain both factual and legal conclusions, to put the securities industry on notice of certain
standards of conduct despite the fact that, unlike ALJ decisions or rulemaking, settlement
creates no positive law. See generally Anne C. Flannery, Time for Change: A Re-Examination
ofthe SettlementPolicies of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1015 (1994); Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 Bus. LAW. 1083, 1140-48
(1992). However, this Note will cite and discuss settled cases as needed given the paucity of
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C. Procedural Issues
1. Forum
Procedural and remedial differences between causing liability and aiding
and abetting liability may suggest proper distinctions between their respective
substantive elements. Therefore, before analyzing the elements of causing
liability, this Note will examine the proper forums for alleging aiding and
abetting claims and causing claims, the remedies available under each theory,
and the additional requirements for obtaining prospective relief.
Two observations regarding the forum for alleging causing liability merit
discussion here. First, even after Central Bank and until quite recently, the
SEC forestalled the development of causing liability law by routinely combin-
ing willful aiding and abetting claims and causing claims in the administrative
forum."8 Throughout the 1990s, the Commission and its ALJs couched both
the allegations and legal findings in their orders in terms of a respondent
"aiding and abetting and causing" securities law violations." 9 However, they
analyzed the facts of these cases solely by reference to the elements of aiding
litigated administrative actions, especially those interpreting causing liability. See Flannery,
supra, at 1015 (noting that SEC settles vast majority of its cases). Furthermore, this Note will
cite aiding and abetting cases brought by private plaintiffs in addition to SEC actions because,
at least in the past, most courts agreed that the language of the substantive federal securities
laws applies to both types of litigants unless stated otherwise. See Sachs, supra note 7, at
1040-43, 1046-47, 1055-58 (criticizing recent shift toward interpreting Exchange Act differ-
ently in public and private actions).
118. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing why SEC used aiding and
abetting before ALJs). In fact, the Commission refused to define the elements of causing
liability officially during the same period that the SEC was unofficially suggesting a mental state
requirement of negligence. See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862,
74 SEC Docket 384,422 n. 104 (Jan. 19,2001) (listing prior unofficial announcements),petition
for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 35,
39 (discussing prior unofficial announcements).
119. See, e.g., Russell Ponce, Exchange Act Release No. 43,235, 73 SEC Docket 442,
443-44, 470 (Aug. 31, 2000) (barring accountant from practicing before Commission and
imposing cease-and-desist order for aiding and abetting and causing reporting and
recordkeeping violations of audit client), appeal docketed, No. 00-71398 (9th Cir. Nov. 1,
2000); John J. Kenny, Initial Decision Release No. 147, 70 SEC Docket 1011, 1011, 1032
(Aug. 6, 1999) (finding that broker aided and abetted and caused superior's fraud); Jeffry L.
Feldman, Securities Act Release No. 7,014, 55 SEC Docket 8, 11-13 (Sept. 20, 1993) (finding
that attorney aided and abetted and caused entity clients' violations of Section 5 of Securities
Act); Hansen, supra note 3, at 354 & n.55 (citing cease-and-desist proceedings involving
allegations of aiding and abetting and causing); Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 17 & n.29
(same); see also James R. Doty, SEC EnforcementActions Against Lawyers: The Next Phase,
35 S. TEX. L. REV. 585, 599 n.63 (1994) (noting that phrasing of orders is important because
it reveals factual conduct that will create liability).
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and abetting. 2° The Commission's only justification for this approach was
that a factual finding that an individual had aided and abetted a violation
"necessarily" implied that his or her conduct was also a cause of that violation
under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act and its parallel Remedies Act
provisions.' By analyzing cases exclusively in terms of aiding and abetting
liability, the Commission avoided any litigation over what conduct, if any,
could trigger causing liability but not liability for aiding and abetting.2  If no
such conduct existed, then causing and aiding and abetting would be substan-
tively identical by reaching exactly the same conduct (despite the different
language in their respective statutes) because the Commission had already
confirmed the converse proposition that all acts of aiding and abetting include
causing.' 
23
The Commission had statutory authority to use aiding and abetting
liability in this way in administrative actions against regulated entities and
associated securities professionals for "willfully" aiding and abetting any
securities law violation. 24 Whether it should have done so is another matter.
120. See, e.g., John J. Kenny, Initial Decision Release No. 147, 70 SEC Docket 1011,
1011, 1032 (Aug. 6, 1999) (finding that broker aided and abetted and caused superior's fraud,
but only analyzing aiding and abetting claim); Jeffry L. Feldman, Securities Act Release No.
7,014, 55 SEC Docket 8, 11-13 (Sept. 20, 1993) (finding that attorney aided and abetted and
caused entity clients' violations of Section 5 of Securities Act, but only discussing law of aiding
and abetting); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 36-37 (noting this practice).
121. See Dominick & Dominick, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 29,243, 50 S.E.C. 571,
578 n.11 (1991) ("Because the Commission finds that [respondent] aided and abetted the
violation, his conduct was necessarily a 'cause' under Section 21C of the Exchange Act of a
violation of the securities laws."); filer & Oilman, supra note 3, at 266 n. 116 (noting use of this
rationale in other cases). The Commission did not explain why it had rejected the view of the
ABA Section 15(cX4) Task Force that causing liability involves a higher causation standard
than aiding and abetting. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (explaining Task
Force's conclusion).
122. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOIF, supra note 99, § 14.34 (suggesting that causing
liability is broader than willful aiding and abetting); Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 17 ("It
remains to be seen whether something less than aiding and abetting can nevertheless be deemed
a cause."); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 36 (stating that no standard test has
developed for causing liability partly because SEC has refused to distinguish its elements from
those of aiding and abetting).
123. See supra text accompanying note 121 (establishing this converse proposition). Put
another way, if "allAs are Cs" and "all Cs are As," then sets A and C are identical.
124. See supra note 48 (discussing liability under Sections 15(bX4) and 15(bX6) of
Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)); see also 2 MATTHEW BENDER & CO., supra note 2,
§ 9.02[21[c][i] (discussing definition of "willfully"); 6 Louis Loss & JoEL SEuGMAN, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 3034-39 & n.152 (3d ed. 1990) (same). But see Jeffry L. Feldman, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 7,014, 55 SEC Docket 8, 11-13 (Sept. 20, 1993) (finding, in settled
administrative proceeding not involving Rule 102(e), that attorney "aided and abetted and
caused" entity clients' violations of Section 5 of Securities Act, but only discussing law of
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This practice could have delayed the development of causing liability indefi-
nitely by essentially hiding it under the rubric of aiding and abetting. How-
ever, prompted by its ALJs, 2 the Commission eventually abandoned its "tacit
policy not to explore the boundaries" of causing liability126 and, beginning
with the KPMG case decided in January 2001, began deciding administrative
proceedings based solely on that theory.121 To be sure, even today the SEC
continues to use combined administrative proceedings alleging both aiding
and abetting and causing liability against regulated persons, ostensibly to pile
a cease-and-desist order on top of the other available remedies . 2  Neverthe-
less, one hopes that the SEC will continue to bring cases charging only
causing liability in order to engender more litigation over the precise conduct
that causing liability encompasses and thereby generate a greater respect for
causing liability as an independent form of secondary liability.
aiding and abetting). The substantive elements of these types of aiding and abetting are the
same as under Section 20(e). See H.J. Meyers & Co., Initial Decision Release No. 211, 2002
SEC LEXIS 2075, at *90-91 (Aug. 9, 2002) (reciting traditional test for aiding and abetting in
broker-dealer disciplinary case). However, "willful" in the Section 15(b) context means only
that a person knows what he is doing, while in the Rule 102(e) context it means knowledge that
one took part in an activity that is illegal. See Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 80, 92-93 (discuss-
ing various definitions of willfulness).
125. See infra notes 186-87 (citing cases in which ALJs analyzed aiding and abetting
liability separately from causing liability even though Enforcement Division brought combined
charges); cf Byron G. Borgardt, Initial Decision Release No. 167, 72 SEC Docket 1675,
1709-10 (June 1, 2000) (finding, in first case decided by ALJ charging only causing liability,
that respondent negligently caused investment company to issue false registration statements
by signing them).
126. Hansen, supra note 3, at 355.
127. See, e.g., Michael A. Kolberg, Exchange Act Release No. 45,853, 77 SEC Docket
1625, 1628-29 (May 1, 2002) (finding that plant accountant caused company to violate
reporting and recordkeeping provisions); Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693, 77
SEC Docket 851, 859-60 (Apr. 4, 2002) (determining that officer caused corporation's
violation of antifraud provisions); Joan L. Fleener, Securities Act Release No. 8,000, 75 SEC
Docket 1739, 1740-41 (Aug. 14, 2001) (concluding that executives at two corporations caused
bond promoters to violate Section 17 with fraudulent bond offering); see also infra Parts III.C.3
& HL.E.1 (discussing KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC
Docket 384 (Jan. 19, 2001), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
128. See, e.g., ND Money Mgmt., Exchange Act Release No. 45,743, 77 SEC Docket
1331, 1334-35 (Apr. 12, 2002) (finding that registered representatives both aided and abetted
and caused investment adviser and investment company violations); IMS/CPAs & Assocs.,
Exchange Act Release No. 45,019, 76 SEC Docket 669, 686 & n.40, 693 (Nov. 5, 2001)
(imposing investment adviser registration suspension for willfully aiding and abetting fraud and
cease-and-desist order for causing it); see also Hansen, supra note 3, at 350-51, 353 (noting
how SEC is piling administrative remedies on regulated entities and their agents); Hiler &
Oilman, supra note 3, at 241-43 (same); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 466-67 (same); Peloso &
Corley, supra note 16, at 16 (same).
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The second important issue regarding the forum for causing liability
claims is the proper conclusion to draw from the fact that Congress allows the
SEC to allege causing liability only in an administrative setting, whereas it
may use the aiding and abetting theory in court. Administrative cases proceed
more quickly than federal court proceedings because of relatively lax eviden-
tiary and procedural rules as well as restricted discovery.'29 The limited but
flexible administrative forum, the expansion of which was a major purpose of
the Remedies Act, seems to dovetail best with the prosecution of less culpable
actors who are more likely to have extenuating circumstances that judges
might be unwilling or unable to consider in court.131 This congruence between
procedure and culpability is initial evidence supporting the textual argument
that the substantive elements of causing liability claims should be less de-
manding than those of aiding and abetting liability. However, this evidence
is quite weak because the SEC can also allege aiding and abetting in the
administrative forum against securities professionals.'3
2. Remedies
The different remedies that the SEC can impose on those who cause
violations versus those who aid and abet them is stronger evidence that
causing liability has a lower substantive culpability standard than that of
aiding and abetting liability. Regarding the remedies for aiding and abetting,
a federal district judge may impose a civil monetary penalty or an injunction
on anyone who aids and abets an Exchange Act violation. 32 Furthermore,
courts have retained the right to combine injunctions with traditional forms
of ancillary equitable relief (including disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, asset
freezes, and appointment of receivers) in the securities law context despite the
fact that, until very recently, no statute gave the SEC the authority to seek
these remedies in court.133 The SEC responds to an injunction violation by
129. See 2 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., supra note 2, § 9.02[2] (stating that SEC Rules of
Practice govern ALJ proceedings in lieu of Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure);
Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1310-11 (noting relative speed of ALJ actions); Morrissey,
supra note 3, at 464 (noting evidentiary and procedural differences).
130. See Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 269 (stating that SEC has used administrative
cease-and-desist authority to distinguish violators based on conduct, involvement, and status).
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing willful aiding and abetting).
132. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (authorizing
SEC aiding and abetting claims in actions under Sections 21 (d)(1) and (3) of Exchange Act);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(dXl), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(dX1), (3) (2000) (authorizing
SEC injunctive and monetary penalty actions in district court).
133. See Goodenow, supra note 9, at 67, 69, 71 (noting that Central Bank could end
practice of judicially implied ancillary equitable relief). But see Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u(dX5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (allowing courts to grant
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seeking a contempt charge from the issuing judge that results in fines or
imprisonment. s4 Finally, under the federal securities laws, an injunction for
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities has certain
"collateral consequences" that have caused some courts to view such an
injunction as punitive rather than remedial. 3 These consequences include:
(1) a duty to disclose the existence of any injunctions against an issuer in all
its SEC filings, (2) automatic loss of most Securities Act registration exemp-
tions, (3) automatic application of administrative penalties (censure, activity
limitations, and registration suspension or revocation) against enjoined
broker-dealers and investment advisers, (4) automatic temporary suspension
of the privilege of practicing before the Commission against enjoined attor-
neys and accountants, (5) disqualification of enjoined individuals from
serving as directors or officers of investment companies, and (6) possible
disqualification from stock exchanges and other self-regulatory organiza-
tions. 1
36
In contrast, a person who causes a securities law violation is only subject
to an order requiring that person to "cease and desist from committing or
causing such violation and any future violation of the same provision, rule, or
regulation" and to take steps to effect present and future compliance with the
law if the Commission so orders. 37  Cease-and-desist orders are similar to
injunctions, 13 but differ in a few key respects. First, disgorgement in cease-
and-desist proceedings has always been an express remedy under the Reme-
dies Act.13 9 Second, if the SEC seeks to enforce a cease-and-desist order, it
all forms of equitable relief in SEC actions for violations of any securities law under Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002).
134. See Morrissey, supra note 3, at 432 (discussing enforcement of injunctions).
135. See Levy, supra note 16, at 651 (explaining effect of collateral consequences on role
of injunctions).
136. See Andrew M. Smith, SEC Cease-and-Desist Orders, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1197,
1219-25 (1999) (discussing collateral consequences of securities law injunctions); Levy, supra
note 16, at 673-75 (same).
137. Securities Act of 1933 § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a) (2000); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(0(1), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-9(f)(1) (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(kXl), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(kXl) (2000). A party may appeal an AL's imposition of a permanent cease-and-desist order
first to the Commission itself and then to a federal court of appeals. See Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 25(aX), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(aXl) (2000) (providing judicial review); SEC Rule of
Practice 410(a), 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(a) (2002) (providing Commission review).
138. Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 5 8.
139. Securities Act of 1933 § 8A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(e) (2000); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 21C(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(f(5), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-9(0(5) (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(kX5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(kXS) (2000). But see supra note 133 (noting recent codification of ancillary equitable relief
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must leave the administrative forum and ask a federal judge either to impose
a civil monetary penalty on the person who violated the order"4 or to issue an
injunction directing compliance with the order, the violation of which could
lead to contempt charges. 4' Finally, the cease-and-desist order carries no
collateral consequences beyond disclosure.
141
Clearly, the remedies for causing a violation are weaker (or at least more
flexible) than those for aiding and abetting a violation because (1) the SEC
must go through more steps to secure punitive monetary penalties or contempt
sanctions against those who cause violations and (2) cease-and-desist orders
lack the collateral consequences of injunctions. 4  By passing the Remedies
Act, Congress intended for the SEC to use the remedial flexibility of the
cease-and-desist order to address isolated and less egregious-but nevertheless
illegal--conduct.' Thus, one could reasonably infer that Congress also
for securities law cases in federal court).
140. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (2000); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 21(dX3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2000); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 42(e),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (e) (2000); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e)
(2000). The fine for disobeying a cease-and-desist order is rather severe, ranging from $5,000
to $500,000 or the amount of the defendant's pecuniary gain resulting from the violation, if
higher. 2 MATrMW BENDER& Co., FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 10.10[10][C] (4th ed.
2002). A court may fine a defendant separately for each discrete violation of an order or for
each day of failed compliance in cases of continuing violations. Id.
141. See Peloso & Corley, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that remedies include injunction
directing compliance).
142. See Smith, supra note 136, at 1221-23 (noting lack of collateral consequences for
cease-and-desist orders). However, cease-and-desist orders may trigger Nasdaq delisting or
state disciplinary action. Id. at 1224-25.
143. See id. at 1217-18 (noting that cease-and-desist orders lack harsh collateral conse-
quences of injunctions); Cook, supra note 16, at 380 (noting that cease-and-desist orders create
"new lowest boundary of punishment" and allow SEC to stop violations "flexibly" by avoiding
federal district court litigation); Levy, supra note 16, at 679 n.214 (outlining many steps to
secure contempt sanctions for enforcing cease-and-desist orders). But see Hansen, supra note
3, at 360 n.75 (warning that subsequent private plaintiffs could use factual findings in settled
cease-and-desist orders for collateral estoppel or as public report evidence under FED. R. EviD.
803(8)(c)). The cease-and-desist order is arguably less harsh than most of the remedies for
willful aiding and abetting by a securities professional as well. See supra note 48 (discussing
willful aiding and abetting provisions). Although censure is perhaps the mildest of all remedies,
suspension or revocation of a broker-dealer registration or of an attorney's or accountant's
privilege of practicing before the Commission strips the affected individuals of their livelihoods.
See supra note 48 (outlining remedies for willful aiding and abetting under various securities
law provisions). Thus, those remedies have an immediate pecuniary impact that a cease-and-
desist order does not. But see Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 39 (noting that cease-
and-desist orders can also affect defendants' livelihoods).
144. See Morrissey, supra note 3, at 465 (noting that Congress adopted into its reports
statements by former Chairman Breeden that cease-and-desist authority recognized "different
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intended for the procedural flexibility of cease-and-desist orders relative to
injunctions to track the substantive flexibility of causing liability relative to
aiding and abetting liability. 45 That is, given the Remedies Act's purpose of
remedial flexibility, causing liability should be easier to establish than aiding
and abetting liability because the remedy for the former is less severe.
3. Further Showing for Prospective Relief
Although courts have long required the SEC to show a "reasonable"
likelihood of future violation in order to secure an injunction (for both aiding
and abetting and primary violations), 146 until recently considerable contro-
versy existed as to whether the Enforcement Division must make a similar
showing to an AU in order to secure a cease-and-desist order for committing
or causing a violation. 4 The first of the ALJs to consider the issue decided
that this showing was not necessary because no such requirement exists in the
text of the Remedies Act and because Congress intended the cease-and-desist
order to be a rapid and flexible remedy. 48 However, later decisions by other
ALJs were divided on the issue.
49
degrees of securities violations") (citation omitted).
145. See Jeffrey M. Steinberg, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No. 568, 68
SEC Docket 120, 123 (Sept. 11, 1998) (arguing that imposing scienter requirement on causing
liability would "subvert the whole purpose" of providing SEC with remedies to respond to less
egregious conduct); Cox, supra note 48, at 538 ("The [Remedies Act's] Congressional history
is replete with the philosophy that balancing fault with the sanction not only serves the public
interest but also avoids too draconian a sanction being imposed on the defendant.").
146. See Levy, supra note 16, at 649 & n.25 (citing cases requiring showing beyond
underlying violation in order to justify prospective relief). The securities statutes providing for
SEC injunctive actions require a "proper showing" from the Commission for judges to grant
such requests, but courts have held that while that showing does include a reasonable likelihood
of future violation, it does not include irreparable harm or inadequacy of legal remedies given
the statutory rather than equitable basis for the action. Id. at 649; see supra note 8 (citing
injunction statutes). Courts determine the reasonable likelihood of a future violation by
balancing the following factors, which vary somewhat based on the jurisdiction: egregiousness
of offense, repeated offenses, degree of scienter, sincere assurances against future violations,
recognition of wrongful conduct, and likelihood that the defendant's occupation will present
opportunities for future violations. Ferrara et al., supra note 2, at 69.
147. See 2 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., supra note 2, § 9.02[2][c][ii] (noting lingering
question of required showing for cease-and-desist orders); Hansen, supra note 3, at 347-48
(same); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 467 (same); Shah, supra note 22, at 276-77 (same).
148. See Joel Zbar, Administrative Proceedings Rulings Release No. 425, 56 SEC Docket
1784, 1787-89 (Apr. 28, 1994) (explaining why further showing is unnecessary); see also
Smith, supra note 136, at 1207-08 (noting that injunction provisions require showing that
defendant is "about to engage" in future violations, whereas AL may issue cease-and-desist
order against anyone who "has violated" securities laws).
149. Compare Fu-Sung Peter Wu, Initial Decision Release No. 144, 70 SEC Docket 513,
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In January 2001, the Commission held in KPMG Peat Marwick LLP 1 0
537 (July 22, 1999) ("By the explicit language of the statutes, an order may issue absent a
finding that a respondent is apt to commit violations in the future."), rev'd on other grounds,
Exchange Act Release No. 45,694, 77 SEC Docket 922 (Apr. 4, 2002), and Hudson Investors
Fund, Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 139, 69 SEC Docket 1365, 1401 (Mar. 30, 1999)
("These statutes, by their terms, permit the entry of a cease-and-desist order upon concluding
that a violation of the securities laws has occurred."), with Warren 0. Trepp, Initial Decision
Release No. 115, 65 SEC Docket 614, 642 (Aug. 18, 1997) ("Similar to an injunction, there
must be a likelihood of future violation to issue a cease-and-desist order.... "), affid on other
grounds, Exchange Act Release No. 41,913, 70 SEC Docket 2037 (Sept. 24, 1999), and
Valicenti Advisory Servs., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 111, 64 SEC Docket 2363,
2387-88 (July 2, 1997) (requiring reasonable likelihood by analogy to injunctions and cease-
and-desist orders of other agencies), rev'd on other grounds, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 1,774, 53 S.E.C. 1033, 1040-41 (1998) (finding reasonable likelihood on facts as pre-
sented, but not stating if it is required in all cases), aff'd, 198 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1999). In
reviewing the Trepp decision, the Commission cited the age of the case as its reason for
affirming the ALJ's dismissal of the matter, but refused to address "whether the standard
employed by the law judge in denying the Division's request for a cease-and-desist order was
the proper one." Warren GI. Trepp, Exchange Act Release No. 41,913, 70 SEC Docket 2037,
2037-38 (Sept. 24, 1999). For further discussion of Trepp, Wu, and Zbar, see Byron G.
Borgardt, Initial Decision Release No. 167, 72 SEC Docket 1675, 1711-12 (June 1, 2000),
Shah, supra note 22, at 281-83, and Smith, supra note 136, at 1198-1200.
150. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket 384
(Jan. 19, 2001), reconsideration denied, Exchange Act Release No. 44,050, 74 SEC Docket
1351 (Mar. 8, 2001), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Among the
issues the Commission considered in KPMG were whether the SEC can allege causing liability
based on negligence and whether it must show a reasonable likelihood of future violation to
secure a cease-and-desist order. Id. at 421,428-29. The auditing firm of KPMG Peat Marwick
LLP (KPM) had forged a strategic alliance with KPMG BayMark Strategies LLC (Baymark)
in order to provide restructuring consulting services to KPMG audit clients. Id. at 386-89.
KPMG formed Baymark by loaning secured funds to Baymark's principals for use as equity
contributions to Baymark. Id. at 388. One of Baymark's principals, Edward Olson, accepted
the post of chief operating officer at Porta Systems Corp. (Porta), an audit client of KPMG, in
an effort to save Porta from insolvency and in return for a fee based on Porta's earnings. Id. at
392. The Commission found that KPMG violated the auditor independence rules of Regulation
S-X both by engaging in a loan transaction with an officer of an audit client and by receiving
a fee contingent on a client's success. Id. at 412-19. The Commission also found that KPM1
caused Porta to violate Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act by preparing financial statements
submitted as part of Porta's Form 10-K that independent accountants had not audited. Id. at
420-21. Based on the plain meaning of Exchange Act Section 21C(a) and its legislative history,
the Commission held that, at least in cases involving a primary violation of a statute that does
not require scienter (such as Section 13(a)), the Enforcement Division can establish causing
liability based on negligence rather than recklessness. Id. at 421-23. In this case, after
receiving notice of a possible independence problem with Porta, two KPMG partners had
unreasonably failed to inquire further and thus subjected KPMG to liability, although their
conduct was not reckless given that they previously discussed the general contours of the
Baymark arrangement with the SEC's Chief Accountant. Id. at 423-28. The Commission also
held that the issuance of a cease-and-desist order requires a showing of some likelihood of
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that an order requiring a person to cease and desist from committing or
causing a securities law violation requires a showing by the Division of
Enforcement that "some" likelihood of a future violation by that person would
exist but for the order.' 5' The Commission justified imposing a likelihood
requirement by saying that, like an injunction, a cease-and-desist order is
prospective by definition, so that "[i]f there is no possible risk of future
violation, it is difficult to see the remedial purpose" of the order.I" However,
the Commission appeared to take a middle position in the debate over the
likelihood requirement by further reasoning that both the statutory text of
Exchange Act Sections 21C(a) and 21(d) and the legislative history of the
former suggest that Congress intended the required showing for a cease-and-
desist order to be "significantly less" than that for an injunction.'53 Specifi-
cally, the Commission stated: "Though 'some' risk is necessary, it need not
be very great .... Absent evidence to the contrary, a finding of violation
raises a sufficient risk of future violation."' 54
Thus, the Commission created a likelihood requirement for cease-and-
desist orders, but then subjected it to a rebuttable presumption in the SEC's
favor by basing it on the violation that the Division of Enforcement has pre-
sumably just proved. 55 Precisely what rebuttal evidence a respondent could
offer is unclear. In a motion for reconsideration, KPMG argued that the
future violations because that remedy is forward-looking by definition. Id. at 428-29. How-
ever, based on the text and legislative purpose of Section 21C(a), the Commission also found
that the required showing is less than that required for an injunction and that, in most cases, the
Enforcement Division can satisfy it simply by pointing to the current violations at issue. Id. at
430-32, 435-36. Finding that the loan and fee arrangements each independently warranted a
sanction, the Commission ordered KPMO to cease-and-desist from violating Regulation S-X
or causing a violation of Section 13(a). Id. at 436-38.
151. Id. at428-30.
152. Id. at 429-30.
153. See id. at 430-32, 435-36 (comparing "has violated" standard for cease-and-desist
orders with "about to engage" standard for injunctions and noting that Congress intended for
SEC to use orders as alternative remedies against isolated and less threatening conduct). The
Commission also found that the cease-and-desist order practices of other federal agencies did
not provide clear guidance on the likelihood requirement issue. Id. at 433-35.
154. Id. at 430.
155. See 0. Bradley Taylor, Initial Decision Release No. 215, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2429, at
*37 (Sept. 24, 2002) (finding strong likelihood of future violation and imposing cease-and-
desist order based solely on respondent's "disregard for the securities laws" in case at hand),
final, Exchange Act Release No. 46,711, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2713, at *1 (Oct. 23, 2002);
Crimmins & Herr, supra note 5, at 1086-87 (discussing post-KPMG cases applying new
standard, all of which resulted in cease-and-desist orders); Mixter, supra note 22, at 989 n.101
(calling KPMG requirement mere "perfunctory showing"); cf Shah, supra note 22, at 289 ("In
practical effect, the Commission's decision means that no showing of likelihood of future
violations is required for cease-and-desist orders.").
LIABILITY FOR "CA USING" VIOLATIONS
presumption "nullified" the requirement because the "'question of whether or
not to issue a cease-and-desist order only arises after there has been a finding
of a past violation, and issuance of a cease-and-desist order would become
automatic if nothing more were required to show future likelihood."" 6 In
denying this claim and KPMG's motion, the Commission reiterated its state-
ment from the original opinion that "[a]long with the risk of future violations,
we will continue to consider our traditional factors" for determining whether
the Commission should exercise its discretion to impose sanctions for securi-
ties law violations.5 7 These so-called "Steadman factors" include:
The egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent
nature of the infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the
defendant's assurances against futureviolations, the defendant's recognition
of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that his occupation
will present opportunities for future violations.""8
Because these factors are substantially the same ones that courts consider to
determine whether a reasonable likelihood of future violations exists to war-
rant an injunction,'5 9 one would think that an administrative respondent could
also use them to rebut the "some likelihood" presumption for cease-and-desist
orders. However, the Commission specifically stated that it will use the
Steadman factor inquiry "not to determine whether there is a 'reasonable
likelihood' of future violations but to guide our discretion."' 6
Despite this ambiguity, in May 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission's standard on a petition
for review by KPMG.' 61 The court found that the language and history of
Exchange Act Section 21 C supported the use of a lower risk of future violation
156. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 44,050,74 SEC Docket 1351,
1360 (Mar. 8,2001).
157. Id. (quoting KPMO Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862,74 SEC
Docket 384, 436 (Jan. 19, 2001), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002));
see 2 MATrEW BENDER & Co., supra note 2, § 9.02[2][c][iii] (discussing Steadman factors).
158. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket 384,
428 (Jan. 19, 2001) (quoting Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on
other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981)), petitionfor review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
In its KPMG ruling, the Commission added to these traditional factors by stating that, in issuing
cease-and-desist orders, it would also consider the recency of the violation, the resulting degree
of harm to investors or the marketplace, the remedial function of a cease-and-desist order in
light of other sanctions being sought in the same proceedings, and possibly the use of the order
as a means of alerting the public about the violation. Id. at 436 & n.148.
159. See id. at 436 (calling cease-and-desist factors "akin" to injunction factors); cf supra
note 146 (discussing injunction factors).
160. KPMG, 74 SEC Docket at 436.
161. KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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for cease-and-desist orders.162 Although the ruling applies to all cease-and-
desist orders, it is particularly important for causing liability. The contrast
between the rigorous showing of the likelihood of future violations that judges
require for an injunction 16 and the negligible additional proof of recidivism
that ALJs must consider for a cease-and-desist order further suggests that
aiding and abetting liability should require a greater degree of culpability than
causing liability. The substantive and remedial standards governing these two
doctrines should be symmetric.
D. Applicability: Types of Violators and Violations
As just described, the procedural differences between causing liability and
aiding and abetting liability suggest that the substantive elements of the former
should be easier to establish than those of the latter. However, before analyz-
ing whether the law does or should recognize such a substantive distinction,
this Note addresses a preliminary question. Because both forms of liability
require a primary violation, the two could differ based on whether the securi-
ties statutes or SEC enforcement practices have limited either of these doc-
trines to particular classes of securities law violators or primary violations. If
causing liability applies to a broader range of primary offenses-and hence to
less serious offenses-than does aiding and abetting liability, then one might
further expect the substantive requirements of causing liability to be less
demanding.
Unlike Exchange Act Section 15(c)(4), the causing liability sections
created by the Remedies Act do not contain any explicit coverage limitations;
rather, they apply to "any person" causing a violation of"any provision" of any
federal securities statute.164 The SEC has taken advantage of this breadth by
bringing causing liability claims for a variety of violations against both regu-
lated and nonregulated parties, including: violations by registered representa-
tives of broker-dealer regulations under Section 15 of the Exchange Act, 6 '
162. Id. at 124.
163. See Morrissey, supra note 3, at 453-58 (discussing courts' requiring stronger
showings by SEC to justify injunctions after 1970); Levy, supra note 16, at 651-54 (same).
164. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); see Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (2000) (limiting application to
violations of Sections 12-15 of Exchange Act). The other securities acts have provisions
identical to Section 21 C(a) of the Exchange Act, thus, virtually all securities law violations are
covered by causing liability. See supra note 4 (listing parallel provisions).
165. See, e.g., Larry W. Tyler, Exchange Act Release No. 44,314, 74 SEC Docket 2854,
2855-56 (May 17, 2001) (claiming that representative sold unregistered securities that he was
unlicensed to sell by private placement, thereby willfully aiding and abetting and causing
broker-dealer to violate Securities Act Section 17 and Exchange Act Section 15); see also supra
note 128 and accompanying text (noting that SEC often combines Section 21C causing claims
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issuer reporting and recordkeeping violations under Section 13 of the Ex-
change Act," securities registration violations under Section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act,167 and a variety of fraudulent practices under Sections 1 0(b) and 14 of
the Exchange Act and Section 17 of the Securities Act.16 The SEC has even
begun bringing causing liability actions for violations of the controversial
Regulation FD.169 Furthermore, given the broad definition of "person" in the
securities laws,' 70 the SEC has been quite willing to allege and find that natural
persons have caused business entities to violate the law 7' and, in a few in-
stances, even that one entity caused another entity's violations.' In fact, the
and Section 15 willful aiding and abetting claims against regulated parties).
166. See, e.g., Carl Albano, Exchange Act Release No. 44,765, 75 SEC Docket 2185,
2186, 2189 (Sept. 5, 2001) (alleging that general manager caused his company to violate
reporting and recordkeeping provisions by filing misleading Form 10-Qs and failing to maintain
adequate books and records).
167. See, e.g., Tyler, 74 SEC Docket at 2855-56 (claiming that representative sold
unregistered securities that he was unlicensed to sell by private placement, thereby violating and
causing his broker-dealer to violate Securities Act Sections 5 and 17 and Exchange Act Section
10(b)).
168. See, e.g., Douglas E. Costa, Exchange Act Release No. 45,636, 77 SEC Docket 666,
668-69 (Mar. 25, 2002) (finding that CEO and corporate counsel caused corporation to violate
Sections 10(b) and 17 by overstating value of assets at shareholders' meeting and on website);
Joseph H. Kiser, Exchange Act Release No. 44,859, 75 SEC Docket 2631, 2633-34 (Sept. 27,
2001) (concluding that executive caused company to violate Section 14 by signing proxy
statement without ensuring that it disclosed all compensation he had received that year, which
it did not); Sharon M. Graham, Exchange Act Release No. 40,727, 53 S.E.C. 1072, 1075-76,
1080-82, 1084-85 & n.35, 1090 (1998) (finding that broker-dealer representative willfully
aided and abetted, and thus also caused, client's fraud violations by executing his wash trades
and matched orders), aff'd, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
169. See Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 46,897,2002 SEC LEXIS 3020, at *2,
18 (Nov. 25, 2002) (finding that CFO caused corporation's Regulation FD violations by
selectively disclosing earnings guidance to analysts). The Commission seems to be operating
under the premise that, because Regulation FD directs issuers to disclose to the public earlier
selective disclosures made by the issuer or its agents to analysts, only the issuer itself can be a
primary violator of Regulation FD by failing to disclose publicly. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(a) (2002) (requiring public disclosure by issuers); Raytheon, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3020,
at *2 ("This matter involves violations of Regulation FD by Raytheon through its Chief
Financial Officer, Caine."). Therefore, officers can be liable only for causing their corporations'
violations.
170. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX9) (2000)
(defining "person" as used in Exchange Act to include, inter alia, both natural persons and
business entities).
171. See, e.g., Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693, 77 SEC Docket 851,
859-60 (Apr. 4, 2002) (determining that officer caused corporation's violation of antifraud
provisions).
172. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 46,216, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 1824, at *38 (July 17, 2002) (concluding that accounting firm caused audit client's
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SEC seems to claim that a person caused an entity to violate the law much
more often than it claims that a person caused another person to do so, perhaps
because the antiquated Section 15(c)(4) causing liability applied only in the
former situation.
113
In contrast to the causing liability provisions, the 1995 aiding and abetting
statute applies to all persons but only for Exchange Act violations,'74 whereas
provisions in various statutes prohibit willfully aiding and abetting violations
of any securities law, but only by certain regulated persons."' Thus, the
statutory reach of causing liability is broader than that of aiding and abetting
liability. Nevertheless, the SEC has brought civil actions alleging aiding and
abetting of most of the same Exchange Act violations for which it has alleged
causing liability. 76 The Commission also seems more willing to allege that a
person aided and abetted another person rather than an entity.
1 77
violations); Ashford.com, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,052, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1484, at
*30 (June 10, 2002) (finding that corporation caused contractual partner corporation's viola-
tions); Korea Data Sys. USA, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,047, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1510,
at *11 (June 7, 2002) (finding that one corporation, along with its officers, caused violations by
second corporation); KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC
Docket 384, 420, 428 (Jan. 19, 2001) (concluding that accounting firm caused audit client's
violations), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The author worked on
the Ashford.com case as a legal intern at the SEC.
173. See, e.g., Chan, 77 SEC Docket at 867 (determining that officer caused corporation's
violation of antifraud provisions); see also supra text accompanying notes 71-72 (discussing
purpose of Section 15(c)(4)). But see, e.g., Rodona Garst, Exchange Act Release No. 46,987,
2002 SEC LEXIS 3167, at *2-4 (Dec. 11, 2002) (finding that individual intentionally caused
other individual's Rule lob-5 violations).
174. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (applying
aiding and abetting liability to "any person" who knowingly provides substantial assistance to
another in violation of Exchange Act).
175. See supra note 48 (listing aiding and abetting provisions for regulated entities and
persons).
176. See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (alleging that defendant
aided and abetted Section 13 reporting and recordkeeping violations by concocting transaction
that overstated assets on company's securities registration statement); SEC v. Milan Capital
Group, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0108 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 2001) (alleging that president of registered broker-dealer aided and abetted firm's violation
of Exchange Act's broker-dealer registration requirements); SEC v. Lybrand, No. 00 Civ. 1387
(SHS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9388, at *1-4, 7-9 (S.D.N.Y. July 6,2000) (alleging that various
persons aided and abetted stock promoter's market manipulation scheme in violation of Section
10(b)); SEC v. Ernst & Young, 775 F. Supp. 411,412 (D.D.C. 1991) (alleging that auditing
firm aided and abetted company's Section 14 proxy violations by incorrectly certifying that it
was independent of company); see also Cox, supra note 48, at 537 (noting that SEC enforce-
ment actions have "successfully equated cause with conduct that could equally be regarded as
aiding and abetting").
177. See, e.g., SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1280-82, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
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In sum, although the statutory breadth of causing liability is greater than
that of aiding and abetting liability, the SEC has routinely applied both doc-
trines to the same types of primary violations. Moreover, causing liability and
aiding and abetting liability apply to primary violations of roughly the same
severity. Therefore, the applicability of causing liability relative to aiding and
abetting liability does not provide much guidance for determining the proper
substantive elements of the former. An examination of those substantive
elements follows.
E. Substantive Elements
1. Degree of Knowledge
As noted above, throughout the 1990s the SEC consistently used its
prosecutions of securities professionals for willful aiding and abetting to
maintain, in a conclusory fashion, that one who aids and abets another's
violation of the federal securities laws is necessarily also a cause of such
violation under Section 21C(a).'" In other words, at least one of the three
general elements of both aiding and abetting liability and causing liability (an
act or omission, performed with some mental state, that furthers a primary
violation) is more difficult to establish for aiding and abetting liability, or all
three operate under the same standard for both types of liability."' If and only
if the latter situation is true does a finding of causing liability necessarily imply
aiding and abetting, 180 in which case the only differences between the two
doctrines are remedial.1 '
attorney aided and abetted fraud violations of company and its promoter by preparing Form 10-
Qs that failed to disclose degree of promoter's control over company and previous securities
fraud violations); Lybrand, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9388, at *1-4, 7-9 (alleging that various
persons aided and abetted stock promoter's market manipulation scheme in violation of Section
10(b)); SEC v. Moskowitz, No. 97 Civ. 7174 (iB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12994, at *1-5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1998) (alleging that defendant aided and abetted CEO and trust's Section
10(b) violations by helping CEO conceal fraud).
178. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Howard, Initial Decision Release No. 138, 69 SEC Docket
1226, 1243 (Mar. 24, 1999) (stating that aiding and abetting necessarily implies causing), af'd,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,357,2003 SEC LEXIS 377, at *21 n.24 (Feb. 12, 2003); Sharon
M. Graham, Exchange Act Release No. 40,727,53 S.E.C. 1072,1085 n.35 (1998) (same), aff'd,
222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Dominick & Dominick, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 29,243,
50 S.E.C. 571, 578 n.11 (1991) (same); supra notes 118, 121, and accompanying text (noting
this trend of "implied" causing liability).
179. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (giving elements for aiding and abetting
liability and causing liability).
180. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (establishing corollary to SEC position as
proper inquiry).
181. See supra Part lII.C (examining procedural differences between causing liability and
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The Commission's January 2001 decision in KPMG is easily the most
important case interpreting causing liability to date because, by holding that a
person may negligently cause another person's violation, it rejected the idea
that causing is equivalent to aiding and abetting and thereby recognized
causing liability as a distinct theory of secondary liability." 2 Before KPMG,
courts had long held that aiding and abetting required "scienter," a mental state
embracing knowing or reckless but not negligent assistance of a primary
violation."8 3 The 1995 aiding and abetting restoration statute complicated
matters by using the word "knowingly," prompting one court to speculate that
even recklessness no longer sufficed.8 4
This mental state debate spilled over from aiding and abetting liability
into causing liability as commentators pondered whether the language "knew
or should have known" in the Remedies Act's causing liability provisions
implied a recklessness or negligence standard." 5 For nearly ten years the
aiding and abetting liability).
182. See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket
384, 421 (Jan. 19, 2001) (holding that negligent conduct meets culpability standard for causing
liability in most cases), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002); supra note
150 (discussing facts of KPMG); see also Shah, supra note 22, at 273 (noting "groundbreaking
illumination" provided by KPMG).
183. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 194 n.12 (1976) (defining
scienter as "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," which might
include reckless, but not negligent, behavior); Graham, 53 S.E.C. at 1084 n.33 ("Knowledge
means awareness of the underlying facts, not the labels that the law places on those facts.
Except in very rare instances, no area of the law not even the criminal law demands that a
defendant have thought his actions were illegal." (quoting SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629
F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); supra note 44 and accompanying text (defining recklessness and
describing case law on whether recklessness satisfies scienter requirement for aiding and
abetting).
184. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing Fehn).
185. See Doty, supra note 119, at 604-05 (arguing that SEC will be on sound footing as
long as it continues to require scienter for causing liability against attorneys because it should
not set professional standards); -filer & Gilman, supra note 3, at 266-68 (assessing dangers of
SEC's apparent preference for negligence standard; namely, that accountants and attorneys
could be liable for negligent advice); Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1308-09, 1317-25
(noting that unresolved mental state issue could broaden causing liability and listing administra-
tive actions that SEC should not take against attorneys); Maxey, supra note 12, at 570-78
(showing that Commission is using negligence standard without saying so as end run around
Rule 102(e) process for pursuing attorneys); Morrissey, supra note 3, at 464-67 (noting
unfairness of using negligence standard with broad net of liability against attorneys, accoun-
tants, and broker-dealers who are already subject to more specific regulations); Peloso &
Corley, supra note 16, at 17 & n.31 (doubting that negligence will trigger causing liability given
Commission's references to aiding and abetting in cease-and-desist orders); Lawton & Botti-
celli, supra note 19, at 34, 39 (assessing dangers of SEC's apparent preference for negligence
standard).
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Commission clung to its mantra that aiding and abetting liability necessarily
implied causing liability and avoided the opportunity to clarify the law of
causing liability.186 Perhaps the rise of conflicting ALJ opinions on the issue
finally prompted the Commission to act.1
87
186. See Russell Ponce, Exchange Act Release No. 43,235, 73 SEC Docket 442, 452-59
& n.25 (Aug. 31, 2000) (listing elements of both aiding and abetting and causing liability, but
analyzing facts only in terms of former), appeal docketed, No. 00-71398 (9th Cir. Nov. 1,
2000); Valicenti Advisory Servs., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 111, 64 SEC Docket 2363,
2382-83 (July 2, 1997) (finding that investment adviser caused firm's violations but did not
willfully aid and abet them because he acted negligently but not knowingly or recklessly), revd,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1,774, 53 S.E.C. 1033, 1040 & n.1 1 (1998) (reversing
ALJ, finding aiding and abetting, and noting that it requires scienter whereas causing liability
is based on "knew or should have known" language, but stopping short of calling that language
indicative of negligence), affid, 198 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1999); Sharon M. Graham, Initial Decision
Release No. 82, 60 SEC Docket 3162, 3163, 3201-07, 3212 (Dec. 28, 1995) (finding that
broker-dealer representative knowingly or recklessly aided and abetted fraud by executing wash
trades of customer, but that even if she had not, she still would have caused violation under
negligence standard), af'd, Exchange Act Release No. 40,727, 53 S.E.C. 1072, 1085 n.35
(1998) (noting that aiding and abetting implies causing but not analyzing causing liability claim
as ALJ did in dictum), affj'd, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ignoring causing liability claim
altogether); supra notes 118, 126, and accompanying text (noting tacit Commission policy not
to explore bounds of causing liability). The ALJ who decided Graham had used the same
reasoning in prior related proceedings, and the Commission dodged the issue when hearing
those appeals as well. See Carole L. Haynes, Initial Decision Release No. 78, 60 SEC Docket
2294, 2341 (Nov. 24, 1995) (using same reasoning as Graham),final, Exchange Act Release
No. 36,692, 61 SEC Docket 66 (Jan. 5, 1996); Richard M. Kulak, Initial Decision Release No.
75, 60 SEC Docket 1010, 1053-54 (Sept. 26, 1995) (same), appeal dismissed, Exchange Act
Release No. 38,657, 64 SEC Docket 1615 (May 20, 1997); Adrian C. Havill, Initial Decision
Release No. 74, 60 SEC Docket 371,402 (Aug. 31, 1995) (same), aff'd, Exchange Act Release
No. 40,726, 53 S.E.C. 1060 (1998); Richard D. Chema, Initial Decision Release No. 71, 60
SEC Docket 124, 167 (Aug. 22, 1995) (same), rev'd on other grounds, Exchange Act Release
No. 40,719, 53 S.E.C. 1049 (1998).
187. Compare Byron G. Borgardt, Initial Decision Release No. 167, 72 SEC Docket 1675,
1710 (June 1, 2000) (noting that Commission had not yet decided mental state requirement for
causing liability, choosing negligence standard based on Jones, infra, and applying it to
respondents who did not knowingly cause investment company to issue false registration
statements by signing them, but nonetheless did so negligently), Jeffrey M. Steinberg, Adminis-
trative Proceedings Rulings Release No. 568, 68 SEC Docket 120, 121-23 (Sept. 11, 1998)
(noting dearth of causing liability law, but concluding that negligence standard applies based
on Section 21C(a) text, Section 1 5(cX4), and legislative intent), and Edward D. Jones & Co.,
Initial Decision Release No. 125, 66 SEC Docket 3086, 3093-95 (Apr. 15, 1998) (noting that
Commission had not yet decided mental state requirement for causing liability and choosing
negligence standard, but finding that respondents did not knowingly, recklessly, or negligently
cause broker-dealer to violate Rule 22c-1 under Investment Company Act of 1940),final, 67
SEC Docket 726 (May 28, 1998), with Nicholas P. Howard, Initial Decision Release No. 138,
69 SEC Docket 1226, 1243 (Mar. 24, 1999) (noting that Commission had not yet decided
mental state requirement for causing violations involving fraud, so applying same standard as
for aiding and abetting, despite Commission's hinting at lesser standard by contrasting scienter
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The Commission justified its holding in KPMG in several ways. First, the
Commission stated that the phrase "knew or should have known" is "classic
negligence language" and should operate under its "ordinary meaning," at least
in the context of cases in which the primary violation does not require
scienter.' 8 That this argument was the Commission's first is unsurprising
given that the same textualist reasoning had nearly eliminated its ability to
allege aiding and abetting seven years earlier in Central Bank." 9 Second, the
Commission responded to the policy concerns that many commentators had
expressed regarding the ability of the SEC to prosecute remote secondary
actors too easily under a mere negligence standard' by saying that Congress
easily could have used different language (such as the knowingly aiding and
abetting standard in Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act) if it had wanted to
apply a scienter-based standard.' 91 Third, the Commission argued that the
legislative history of the Remedies Act, with its emphasis on remedial flexibil-
ity, demonstrated that Congress intended causing liability to reach the less
egregious conduct that a negligence standard encompasses." Fourth, the
Commission cited its prior pronouncements and consent orders, congressional
testimony, scholarly commentary, and ALJ opinions as being consistent with
and "knew or should have known" requirements in previous opinions), affid, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,357, 2003 SEC LEXIS 377, at *21-23 (Feb. 12, 2003) (upholding ALJ's
finding of reckless aiding and abetting and causing violations, but not commenting on her
assertion that one cannot negligently cause scienter-based primary violations). Both Jones and
Howard noted the silence of the Remedies Act's legislative history on this issue. Howard, 69
SEC Docket at 1243; Jones, 66 SEC Docket at 3094. However, the ALJ in Jones treated the
issue much more extensively, citing Kern, proceedings related to Graham, and cases interpret-
ing the phrase "should have known" in other contexts. Jones, 66 SEC Docket at 3093-95.
188. See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket
384, 421 & n.101 (Jan. 19, 2001) (citing nonsecurities law cases for proposition that "knew or
should have known" is language of negligence), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (noting that ABA Section
15(c)(4) Task Force made similar arguments in construing that statute and citing leading tort
authorities for same proposition).
189. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing textualist reasoning of
CentralBank).
190. See supra note 185 (reviewing commentators' concerns).
191. KPMG, 74 SEC Docket at 422 n.103.
192. Id. at 422, 431-32. This reasoning parallels the discussion in Part III.C of this Note,
but it is less convincing if aiding and abetting requires knowing assistance because even
reckless causing liability would still be below that standard. See supra Part ffl.C (suggesting
that procedural flexibility calls for lesser standard for causing liability than for aiding and
abetting liability); supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (noting possibility of knowing
aiding and abetting standard). However, even if aiding and abetting requires knowing assis-
tance, negligent causing liability would still provide the most remedial flexibility by allowing
the SEC, in its discretion, to punish the widest range of violators.
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its position. 93 Finally, the Commission cited Kern for the proposition that
Section 15(c)(4) causing liability also operated under a negligence standard
and that Congress incorporated this standard by adopting the language of that
section nearly verbatim in the 1990 causing liability provisions. 9'
Several additional rationales that the Commission did not enunciate also
support the negligence standard of KPMG. First, given that negligence is
generally a better defined concept in the law than recklessness,' 9 ' the KPMG
standard should ensure more predictable results in causing liability adjudica-
tions, which will help individuals pattern their behavior to avoid liability.
Second, allowing causing liability to attach to negligent conduct recognizes the
social harm that negligence causes, leads to more optimal exercise of due care,
and avoids the proof problems inherent in subjective, scienter-based mental
states.96 Finally, causing liability may be the only practical way for the SEC
to pursue secondary violators of the Securities Act, which lacks a general
193. See KPMG, 74 SEC Docket at 422 n.104 (citing Rita L. Schwartz, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,684, 72 SEC Docket 514, 518 (Apr. 13, 2000); Amendment to Rule 102(e) of
the Commission's Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 40,567, 68 SEC Docket 707,
710 & n.38 (Oct. 26, 1998) (identifying causing liability as example of securities laws imposing
liability for unintentional conduct); Incomnet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 40,281, 67 SEC
Docket 2062,2070 (July 30, 1998); Edward D. Jones & Co., Initial Decision Release No. 125,
66 SEC Docket 3086, 3093-95 (Apr. 15, 1998); Carole L. Haynes, Initial Decision Release No.
78, 60 SEC Docket 2294, 2341 (Nov. 24, 1995),final, Exchange Act Release No. 36,692, 61
SEC Docket 66 (Jan. 5, 1996); Staff Report on Private Securities Litigation: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong. 49 & n.27 (1994) (statement of then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt) (stating that
causing liability "would appear to be as broad, if not broader, than aiding and abetting liability"
and noting that "knew or should have known" equates with negligence in other contexts); 5D
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 261.05c][vii (2000)
(opining that causing liability uses negligence standard except in cases in which primary
violation requires scienter); Luton, supra note 19, at 67 (noting that causing liability appears
to require only negligence); McLucas et al., supra note 4, at 835 (claiming that causing liability
is broader than aiding and abetting)).
194. Id. at 423. But see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (suggesting weak-
nesses in this argument).
195. See MODELPENALCODE ANDCOMMENTARIES § 2.02(2Xc) (1962) (defining reckless-
ness as conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk); KEETON ET AL., supra note 94,
§ 34, at 210-14 (noting that courts have condemned concept of degrees of negligence as
unworkable); Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal,Auditors Whistle an Unhappy Tune, 75 DENV.
U. L. REV. 419,443 (1998) (noting various ways that courts have defined recklessness regarding
conduct of accountants); Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1320 (noting danger of confusing
recklessness with negligence if courts define former as gross negligence); supra note 45 (giving
yet another definition of recklessness common to securities law).
196. See Maxey, supra note 12, at 560 (noting, in context of SEC Rule of Practice 102(e),
that scienter standard would forego deterring harmful negligent conduct and entail proof
problems).
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aiding and abetting provision comparable to the one that Congress added to the
Exchange Act in 1995.1"
Nevertheless, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the Commission's negligence standard in May 2002,19 its
primary reasoning was clear and, like the Commission's opinion, unsurprising
in light of Central Bank. The court stated that the Commission was "virtually
compelled" to adopt a negligence standard by Congress's choice of the phrase
"knew or should have known.' 199 The SEC's textualist revenge on the defense
bar for Central Bank was complete.
By announcing a basic mental state requirement in KPMG, the Commis-
sion took its long-awaited first step toward defining causing liability. How-
ever, the other basic elements of causing liability remain undefined, and the
rest of this Note will attempt to flesh out these requirements. Moreover,
despite the major impact of its holding, the Commission did not even com-
pletely define the mental state requirement for causing liability in KPMG.
Instead, it expressly confined its holding to cases in which the primary viola-
tion does not require scienter and left open the question of whether a secondary
actor can negligently cause a primary actor to violate a federal securities
statute knowingly or recklessly.200
Several ALJs and commentators have subsequently answered this ques-
tion by postulating that only scienter-based conduct can cause scienter-based
primary violations; that is, the causing party must act with the same mental
state that the law requires of the primary violator (or a greater one) in order to
197. See supra note 48 (stating that Securities Act lacks its own aiding and abetting
provision). Nevertheless, the Exchange Act prohibitions on willful aiding and abetting by
securities professionals still apply to primary violations of the Securities Act, such as unregis-
tered stock sales under Section 5 or fraudulent sales under Section 17. See supra note 165
(discussing Tyler, which fits this mold).
198. KPMQ, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
199. Id. at 120. The court also rebutted KPMQ's claim that the SEC could not use causing
liability to regulate accountants in light of the existing Rule 102(e). Id. at 119.
200. See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC Docket
384, 421-22 & n.103 (Jan. 19, 2001) (confining holding), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d
109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Commission stated:
Where, as here, the primary violations do not require culpability beyond negli-
gence, we see no reason not to give the phrase ["knew or should have known"] its
ordinary meaning .... It can be argued that a standard higher than negligence
should be applied to limit the reach of the statute and so avoid the spectre of cease-
and-desist orders against persons who have little contact with the primary actor. At
least in cases such as this one involving non-scienter-based primary violations,
however, this concern does not warrant our imposing a standard higher than
negligence.
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be liable for causing the violation.2"' However, the reasons advanced for this
rule are largely conclusory and simply take the Commission's reserving the
question in KPMG and its subsequent silence on the matter as conclusive
evidence that it would not sanction an action alleging negligent causation of
another's fraud.202 The rule is dubious on its face simply because the text of
201. See H.J. Meyers & Co., Initial Decision Release No. 211,2002 SEC LEXIS 2075, at
*92-94 & n.35 (Aug. 9,2002) (following Yesner and Howard, infra, because Commission had
not yet found in any contested proceeding that person negligently caused primary violations
requiring scienter); Albert Glenn Yesner, Initial Decision Release No. 184,75 SEC Docket 220,
254-66 (May 22, 2001) (finding that controller caused company's non-scienter-based reporting
violations by his negligence but could not have caused its antifraud violations because he did
not act with scienter),final, Exchange Act Release No. 44,452, 75 SEC Docket 648 (June 19,
2001); SE ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECuRUTIEs LAWS
§ 20:132 (2002) (arguing that person cannot negligently contribute to Rule 10b-5 violation
because courts should interpret term "contribute" as equivalent to aiding and abetting despite
its literal breadth); Crimmins & Herr, supra note 5, at 1087 ("The Commission [in KPMG] has
appropriately limited the negligence standard for the 'causing' liability of secondary violators
to instances where the underlying or primary violation is not scienter-based."); Hansen, supra
note 3, at 346 n.26 ("It, however, would be anomalous to require proof of scienter to establish
a primary violation, for example, a violation of Rule 10b-5, but only require negligence to be
found a 'cause' of such a violation."); Shah, supra note 22, at 292 ("The Commission limited
its decision to cases in which the primary violation was not scienter-based; there is no evidence
that Congress, in devising the SEC's cease-and-desist order, intended to lower the state of mind
requirement for secondary violations."); see also Nicholas P. Howard, Initial Decision Release
No. 138, 69 SEC Docket 1226, 1243 (Mar. 24, 1999) (concluding, pre-KPMG, that because
Commission had not decided any cases involving negligent causing of primary violations
requiring scienter, causing party must also act with scienter, at least in these instances), affd,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,357, 2003 SEC LEXIS 377, at *21-23 (Feb. 12, 2003) (uphold-
ing ALJ's finding of reckless aiding and abetting and causing violations, but not commenting
on her assertion that one cannot negligently cause scienter-based primary violations). This is
the approach that courts and the Commission have taken for aiding and abetting. See F.X.C.
Investors Corp., Initial Decision Release No. 218, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3168, at *25-26 (Dec. 9,
2002) ("Irrespective of the level of proof required to establish the primary violation, the
Commission has made clear that the accused aider and abetter must have acted with scienter.")
(citations omitted),final, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,097, 2003 SEC LEXIS 35, at
*1 (Jan. 9, 2003); Lawton & Botticelli, supra note 19, at 34, 36 ("[T]he level of knowledge
required of an aider and abettor was generally that required of a primary violator-knowing or
reckless conduct.").
202. See supra note 201 (giving reasons for rule). Jacobs and Shah argue that the prevail-
ing rule for causing liability must be correct in the absence of any legislative history indicating
congressional intent to depart from the rule for aiding and abetting liability. SE JACOBS, supra
note 201, § 20:132; Shah, supra note 22, at 292 n.130; see supra note 201 and accompanying
text (describing both rules). This argument misses the mark. The text of a statute is the primary
(if not sole) indicator of congressional intent, and Section 21C on its face applies the "knew or
should have known" standard for causing liability to any Exchange Act violation, even those
requiring scienter. Infra note 203. The legislative history of causing liability is virtually
irrelevant in the face of this unambiguous language and the fact that Congress probably never
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 249 (2003)
Section 21C(a) does not mention any requirements regarding the primary
violator's mental state. Instead, the statute applies the "knew or should have
known" standard to any secondary offender causing any Exchange Act viola-
tion, even those requiring scienter.20 3 In contrast to the currently prevailing
rule, then, this Note contends that a person in many cases can negligently cause
another person to violate a securities statute requiring scienter. The reasoning
supporting this approach follows.
In restricting the KPMG holding to primary violations not involving
scienter, the Commissioners probably had a specific fact pattern in mind: a
"classic" form of causing liability, reminiscent of Section 15(c)(4), 214 in which
one or more natural persons cause their business entity to violate a securities
law.2°0 The SEC has recognized causing liability in this situation both when all
the natural persons negligently cause the entity to violate a statute not requiring
scienter2' and when at least one person knowingly or recklessly causes the
entity to violate a statute that does require scienter.207 However, the Commis-
sion has never found that a person or group of people, all acting only negli-
actually intended to create causing liability in the first place. See supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text (describing possibly inadvertent creation of causing liability).
Furthermore, after KPMG, the fact that one cannot negligently aid and abet a scienter-
based violation is immaterial to deciding whether one can negligently cause a scienter-based
violation. In KPMG, the Commission interpreted Section 21C to allow negligent causation of
non-scienter-based violations even though courts had long held that a person could not negli-
gently aid and abet a non-scienter-based violation. The phrase "any provision" has just as plain
a meaning and is just as indicative of legislative intent as is the phrase "knew or should have
known," especially in the absence of any legislative history to the contrary.
203. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000) (applying
"knew or should have known" standard for causing liability to violations of "any provision of
this title, or any rule or regulation thereunder").
204. See supra notes 70, 99, 173 and accompanying text (noting restriction on Section
15(cX4) causing liability to persons causing corporations to violate Exchange Act reporting
requirements).
205. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (noting prevalence of"person causing
entity" cases).
206. See, e.g., Byron 0. Borgardt, Initial Decision Release No. 167, 72 SEC Docket 1675,
1698, 1710-12 (June 1, 2000) (concluding that two officers caused investment company to
violate Securities Act Sections 17(aX2) and 17(aX3), which do not require scienter, by negli-
gently omitting material facts from registration statement). Apparently, a person can even cause
a violation by a corporation to which he or she does not belong. See Korea Data Sys. USA,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,047,2002 SEC LEXIS 1510, at * 11 (June 7,2002) (finding
that one corporation, along with its officers, caused violations of second corporation).
207. See, e.g., Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693, 77 SEC Docket 851,
859-60 (Apr. 4, 2002) (finding that corporate secretary caused corporation to violate Securities
Act Section 17(aX1) and Exchange Act Section 10(b), both of which require scienter, by
knowingly participating in promulgation of fraudulent private placement memorandum).
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gently, caused an entity to violate a scienter-based statute, and for good reason.
Business entities depend on agents to supply them with mental states.28 So,
if the agent or agents in question act negligently, the corporation or other entity
cannot act knowingly or recklessly to commit the primary violation. One or
more of the agents must act with scienter to cause the entity to act with
scienter.2°9 Thus, an officer of a corporation, acting alone, simply cannot
negligently cause his or her corporation to commit securities fraud.
However, unlike Section 15(c)(4), the language of the Remedies Act
extends causing liability to the situation in which one natural person causes
another natural person to violate a securities statute. 10 The SEC has used
causing liability in this way in only a few cases to date, 21 1 and only in situa-
tions in which Person A knowingly or recklessly caused Person B to violate
a statute requiring scienter,212 orA knowingly or recklessly caused B to violate
208. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 99, § 14.12 ("Congress... had to
recognize that a company can act only through its agents and the knowledge of a company can
exist only to the extent the knowledge of its agents is imputed to the company.").
209. For example, suppose that the CEO, CFO, and comptroller of a corporation each
somehow contributed to a scheme designed by the CEO that resulted in the corporation
violating Rule lob-5. The CEO acted knowingly and the CFO acted recklessly, so each may
be both primarily liable and secondarily liable for causing the corporation's violation. How-
ever, even if the comptroller did not know that he was contributing to the fraud but only should
have known, he may still be liable for causing the corporation's violation (which requires
scienter) because any violation may have multiple causes and the corporation already has the
requisite scienter for the primary violation by imputation from the CEO and CFO. See Chan,
77 SEC Docket at 867 ("Thus, the mere fact that others also may have caused [the corporation]
to violate the securities laws does not insulate [the respondent] from [causing] liability for his
own acts and omissions.").
210. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2000) ("The
term 'person' means a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of a government."); supra note 164 and accompanying text (noting that
Section 21 C(a) applies to any person causing violations of any other person).
211. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (noting SEC reluctance to extend
causing liability past bounds of Section 1 5(c)(4)).
212. See Rodona Garst, Exchange Act Release No. 46,987, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3167, at
*2-4 (Dec. 11, 2002) (finding that individual intentionally caused other individual's Rule IOb-5
violations by sending fraudulent e-mail messages written by primary violator); Keith J. Mauney,
Exchange Act Release No. 46,448, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2254, at *7 (Sept. 3, 2002) (finding that
broker-dealer supervisor recklessly caused registered representative to violate antifraud
provisions by executing adjusted trades at representative's behest); Joan L. Fleener, Securities
Act Release No. 8,000, 75 SEC Docket 1739, 1740-41 (Aug. 14, 2001) (concluding that
executives at two corporations knowingly caused bond promoters to violate Securities Act
Section 17(a)l) by providing promoters with false information concerning value of bonds and
companies that those promoters then disseminated to investors); Sharon M. Graham, Exchange
Act Release No. 40,727, 53 S.E.C. 1072, 1075-76, 1080-82 (1998) (finding that broker-dealer
representative willfully aided and abetted, and thus also caused, client's Section 10(b) violations
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a statute that does not require scienter for a primary violation.23 Nonetheless,
in a case involving the same facts except that the secondary defendant acted
only negligently and the primary defendant acted with scienter, no reason
explains why one natural person could not negligently "cause" another natural
person's fraud within the meaning of the Remedies Act, as at least one study
has implicitly recognized.214
If the only impediment is that this situation somehow sounds anomalous,
perhaps the term "causing" liability itself is to blame. Speaking in terms of
one person "causing" another person's violation seems to imply an element
of sole causation. Yet, the text of Section 21 C(a) speaks only in terms of any
person being "a cause" of another person's violation, and the Commission
itself has recognized that "the mere fact that others also may have caused" the
primary violation does not insulate one from causing liability.21 For example,
suppose Person B knowingly concocts a fraudulent securities scheme and
persuades Person A to execute a part of it that would not constitute fraudulent
conduct on its own but that is essential to the success of B's plan. B is then
in some sense a cause of her own violation by deliberate choice. However,
even if A does not know that he is contributing to B's violation but should
know, then the SEC could hold A liable for negligently being a (second) cause
of B's fraud.
by executing his wash trades and matched orders), aff'd, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
213. See John K. Bradley, Exchange Act Release No. 46,035, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1448, at
*10-11 (June 5, 2002) (finding that credit manager caused CFO to lie to auditors in violation
of Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2 by preparing two falsified deferred revenue reports upon CFO's
request); Fleener, 75 SEC Docket at 1740-41 (concluding that executives at two corporations
knowingly caused bond promoters to violate Securities Act Section 17(a)(3) by providing
promoters with false information concerning value of bonds and companies that those promoters
then disseminated to investors).
214. See Hiler & Gilman, supra note 3, at 268 ("A mere negligence standard [for causing
liability] would put persons in management positions at risk of liability for even egregious,
scienter-based violations by others with whom they may have little contact."). As a matter of
policy, the Commission and the ALJs might wish to restrict the applicability of causing liability
in this "negligent causation of fraud" situation, on a case-by-ease basis or as a matter of law, via
a proximate causation requirement. See infra Part M.E.3 (recommending proximate causation
element for causing liability). In this way, the SEC could avoid the "spectre" of sanctioning
remote parties that negligently contribute to scienter-based violations while remaining faithful
to the text of Section 21C by not changing the "ordinary meaning" of the phrases "knew or
should have known" and "any provision" depending on the nature of the primary violation. See
supra note 200 (noting Commission's concerns). However, Congress certainly did not mandate
this restriction in the Remedies Act, and a more expansive view of causing liability in this
regard would not be as ridiculous as some commentators have suggested. See supra note 201
(reviewing commentators' statements).
215. Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693, 77 SEC Docket 851, 867 (Apr. 4,
2002).
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In conclusion, the Commission should hold that both natural persons and
business entities can negligently cause other natural persons and business
entities216 to violate securities statutes that require scienter, except in cases in
which no natural person exists who can supply the entity with the requisite
scienter to commit the primary violation. This approach gives maximum
effect to the statutory text of the Remedies Act and its stated purpose of
covering a wide range of less culpable behavior, but does so only within the
bounds of recognized agency principles217 and common sense.
2. Degree ofAction
The Commission has yet to address the second element of causing
liability: the act requirement. The diction of Sections 21 C(a) and 20(e) of the
Exchange Act certainly suggests that the act requirement for aiding and
abetting liability is more demanding than for causing liability; specifically,
providing "substantial assistance"2 ' seems to require more participation than
performing an act that merely "contributes" to a violation.219 Unfortunately,
case law has added very little gloss to these concepts directly, perhaps be-
216. The Commission has recognized that one entity can cause another entity's violation
as long as the causing entity has the requisite mental state (supplied by its agents) for the
primary violation. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 46,216, 2002
SEC LEXIS 1824, at *38 (July 17, 2002) (concluding that accounting firm caused audit client's
reporting violations); Ashford.com, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,052, 2002 SEC LEXIS
1484, at *30 (June 10, 2002) (finding that corporation caused contractual partner corporation's
reporting violations by negligent acquiescence of its employees); Korea Data Sys. USA, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 46,047, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1510, at * 11 (June 7, 2002) (finding that
one corporation, along with its officers, caused fraud violations of second corporation with
requisite scienter); KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 74 SEC
Docket 384, 420, 428 (Jan. 19, 2001) (concluding that accounting firm caused audit client's
reporting violations through negligence of two partners), petition for review denied, 289 F.3d
109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Again, however, this Note argues that Corporation A could be liable for
causing Corporation B's violation if Agent X of Corporation A negligently contributes to the
knowing or reckless violation of a scienter-based statute by Agent Y of Corporation B.
217. See 3B BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 99, § 14.12 ("[T]he law often imputes
the knowledge of an agent to a principal." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272
(1958))).
218. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000). The term comes
from the RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1965), which summarizes the common
law of aiding and abetting. See Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, LiabililyforAiding and
Abetting bySilence or Inaction: An UnfoundedDoctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14,18-22 (1993)
(discussing aiding and abetting in torts).
219. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2000); see SE
JACOBS, supra note 201, § 20:132 ("The amorphous term 'contribute' also is not defined. Read
literally, it is broader than the secondary liability concepts recognized for Rule lob-5 infrac-
tions, such as aiding and abetting.").
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cause of the wide variety of factual situations in which secondary liability for
securities law violations arises.220 Moreover, one could hardly expect the
Commission to issue a release detailing every possible act that could result in
aiding and abetting or causing a violation.
Even so, a few generalizations are possible. Regarding aiding and
abetting, courts will not characterize "ministerial" assisting acts or those
involving the provision of ordinary business services as substantial assistance
because the aider-abettor derives no unusual economic benefit in those
situations.221  Furthermore, courts have long been divided over whether a
person may aid and abet a violation by silence or inaction, with those courts
recognizing this claim often requiring both a duty to disclose or prevent the
violation and a conscious intent to assist on the part of the secondary defen-
dant. 222
Given that the subject matter of causing liability cases has proven to be
at least as diverse as in aiding and abetting cases,223 a direct analysis of what
220. See Marc N. Geman, Exchange Act Release No. 43,963, 74 SEC Docket 999, 1031
(Feb. 14, 2001) ("In determining whether there has been 'substantial assistance,' we consider
all of the facts and circumstances."); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 8 ("What is
substantial is highly fact-specific, dependent on the nature of the primary violation and on the
nature of the assistance.").
221. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97-98 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding
that bank did not aid and abet fraud by not disclosing customer corporation's insolvency to
other party in transaction because bank lacked high degree of scienter needed to transform
actions that were merely in ordinary course of bank's business into substantial assistance);
Seligman, supra note 38, at 1437-38 (discussing courts' reluctance to recognize ministerial acts
and transactions in ordinary course of business as aiding and abetting); Lawrence A. Steckman
& Robert E. Conner, Loss Causation Under Rule IOb-5, A Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis: When
Should Representational Misconduct Be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal
Securities Laws?, in I SECURITIES ARBrTRATION 1998, at 375, 404-05 (1998) (noting that
courts will not find substantial assistance when banks, attorneys, accountants, or brokers
provide "basic support services to help consummate transactions" and derive no unusual
economic benefit from them). But see Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(concluding that broker-dealer representative aided and abetted customer's matched orders by
executing them, conduct that involved discretion and thus was not ministerial).
222. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 218, at 27 & nn.97-99 (citing cases divided on
this issue); supra notes 35, 43, and accompanying text (discussing judicial division). Unlike
the heightened mental state required for inaction, active aiding and abetting may require a lesser
degree of scienter if proof of the assisting act is strong. See Albert Glenn Yesner, Initial
Decision Release No. 184, 75 SEC Docket 220, 261 (May 22, 2001) ("The second and third
elements of aiding and abetting vary inversely with one another and must be viewed together.
Accordingly, if there is scant evidence of substantial assistance, then there must be more
evidence of scienter."),final, Exchange Act Release No. 44,452, 75 SEC Docket 648 (June 19,
2001).
223. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text (describing range of causing liability
cases).
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acts can constitute contributing to violations is as ineffective as a factual
examination of substantial assistance. But again, two trends are discernible.
First, in a few cases, the SEC has found natural persons liable for causing an
entity's violation simply because they signed a document required to be filed
with the Commission.224 A second recognized trend is that the SEC regularly
institutes causing liability cases based on silence or inaction,225 probably
because Section 21C(a) expressly includes "onissions" while Section 20(e)
does not.226
Because the act of signing a document can have drastic consequences,221
that act is hardly "ministerial" even if it is rather easy to execute. Therefore,
this distinction is insufficient support for the argument that causing liability
has a relatively low act standard. The "act versus omission" dichotomy is a
better way to distinguish the degree of action required for aiding and abetting
versus causing liability at a conceptual rather than factual level, perhaps in
conjunction with the idea of causal nexus as a proxy for degree of action as
discussed below. Given the textual support for causing liability based on
omissions, the lack of such support in the aiding and abetting statutes, and the
longstanding debate over aiding and abetting based on inaction while it was
still an implied right of action, courts should hold either (1) that aiding and
224. See Robert M. Fuller, Initial Decision Release No. 210, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1996, at
*43 (Aug. 2, 2002) (finding that board chairman caused corporation's fraud violation by signing
Form 10-K that he knew contained material misrepresentations and omissions); Deprince, Race
& Zollo, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,035, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1517, at *4 (June
12, 2002) (finding that company's principal was "a cause" of company's violation by signing
forms); cf. Rodona Garst, Exchange Act Release No. 46,987, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3167, at *2-4
(Dec. 11, 2002) (finding that individual intentionally caused other individual's Rule 1ob-5
violations by sending fraudulent e-mail messages written by primary violator).
225. See, e.g., Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693,77 SEC Docket 851, 860
(Apr. 4, 2002) (determining that officer caused corporation's violation of antifraud provisions
by failing to correct private placement memorandum); Byron G. Borgardt, Initial Decision
Release No. 167, 72 SEC Docket 1675, 1675-76, 1680-81 (June 1, 2000) (claiming that
officers of investment company omitted material facts from registration statements, thereby
causing company to violate Section 17 antifraud provisions); Incomnet, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 40,281, 67 SEC Docket 2062, 2070-71 (July 30, 1998) (finding that inside
directors knowingly failed to ensure accuracy of company's public statements); Cox, supra note
48, at 538 ("Overall, cause, as interpreted by the SEC, appears to include within any organiza-
tion those who, though not the source of the false representation to the defrauded investors,
have failed to take action that could have prevented the fraud.").
226. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000) (failing to
include omissions expressly); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21C(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a)
(2000) (including omissions).
227. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 1350(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002) (providing, as part of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, criminal penalties for signing Exchange Act reports while
knowing they are materially inaccurate).
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abetting liability simply does not cover inaction anymore while causing
liability does or (2) that aiding and abetting by omission retains an intent
requirement that causing liability lacks." s Either way, the standard governing
the degree of action for aiding and abetting would be more demanding than
that for causing liability. Thus, this Note argues that, consistent with the
treatment of the mental state requirement in KPMG, the act requirement for
causing liability should be easier to establish than that for aiding and abetting
because only the former expressly includes omissions.
3. Causal Nexus
Lacking textual guidance on the meaning of substantial assistance in the
context of Section 10(b) and perhaps finding the development of the concept
on an ad hoc basis to be unworkable, courts soon adopted the tort approach of
equating substantial assistance with proximate causation for purposes of
analyzing aiding and abetting.229 This conception of proximate cause differs
from the one usually associated with securities fraud because it seeks to link
the aider-abettor's actions not with the victim's monetary loss but with the
primary violator's actions, which in turn directly cause the damages.30
Presumably, however, this type of proximate cause still imports the entire tort
causation framework whereby "but for" or factual causation is a necessary but
insufficient condition for liability, with proximate or legal causation being the
additional requirement that connotes a rough policy judgment as to how
"remote" a factual cause the law should recognize.231 Nevertheless, the SEC
228. See Albert Glenn Yesner, Initial Decision Release No. 184, 75 SEC Docket 220,
261-66 (May 22, 2001) (taking second approach and thus finding that controller caused
company's recordkeeping violations by inaction but did not aid and abet them because he did
not act with requisite level of intent),final, Exchange Act Release No. 44,452, 75 SEC Docket
648 (June 19, 2001); supra Part Mll.E.1 (concluding that causing liability is based on negligence
and thus lacks any intent requirement).
229. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 8 ("To illuminate the meaning of
'substantial,' the cases have often treated substantial assistance as a causation concept, parallel
to the causation requirement for a primary violation."); McNulty & Hanson, supra note 218,
at 25 ("As at common law, the substantial assistance requirement is the equivalent of proximate
cause."); Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1396-97 (noting that courts, lacking textual guidance,
seized on concepts of causation and duty as alternate tests for substantial assistance).
230. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 218, at 25 ("The plaintiff must prove that the
assistance provided by the alleged aider and abettor was a substantial factor in bringing about
the primary violation. Stated otherwise, the primary violation must be a 'direct or reasonably
foreseeable consequence' of the aider and abettor's conduct."); Steckman & Conner, supra note
221, at 403 (noting that issue of proximate causation differs in context of primary versus
secondary liability for securities fraud).
231. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, § 41, at 264 (discussing meaning of proximate
300
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has recognized that neither "but for" nor proximate causation requires that the
secondary defendant's actions be the sole cause of the primary violation; they
need only be a cause of it.232
As commentators have noted, the key question is whether Congress, by
the text of Section 2 1 C(a), meant for the SEC to apply only a "but for" causa-
tion test in causing liability cases or whether ALJs must undertake a proxi-
mate cause analysis as well.233 Even after KPMG, this issue is still unresolved
and has serious policy implications. On the one hand, a factual causation
standard would be more predictable given the notoriously vague and confus-
ing array of tests for proximate cause, most of which ultimately boil down to
a policy judgment. 3 4 On the other hand, only requiring "but for" causation
would cast a wide net of liability around remote secondary actors, 235 and some
would say that Congress never intended such a departure from the substantial
assistance requirement of aiding and abetting. Indeed, a proximate cause
element might imbue cease-and-desist proceedings based on causing liability
with a certain amount of flexibility from the respondent's point of view
(which would complement the procedural flexibility that the Remedies Act
gave the Commission) by permitting policy arguments as to why the SEC
should deem that person too far removed from the violation to be culpable. 36
cause as policy restraint); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 41, at 8 (noting that courts have
held "but for" causation to be insufficient in private aiding and abetting securities law cases).
For a general discussion of factual and legal causation in tort law, see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 94, §§ 41-42, at 263-79.
232. See Erik W. Chan, Exchange Act Release No. 45,693, 77 SEC Docket 851,867 (Apr.
4, 2002) (stating that "mere fact that others also may have caused" violation is no defense to
causing liability); Carole L. Haynes, Initial Decision Release No. 78, 60 SEC Docket 2294,
2339 (Nov. 24, 1995) (stating that aiding and abetting liability requires only that aider-abettor's
substantial assistance is one cause of violation, not sole or even principal cause), final, Ex-
change Act Release No. 36,692, 61 SEC Docket 66 (Jan. 5, 1996).
233. Compare 5E JACOBS, supra note 201, § 20:132 ("[T]he test surely should be proxi-
mate cause rather than a cause-in-fact."), and Hansen, supra note 3, at 346 (arguing that causing
liability should require proximate causation), with Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1308-09
(noting that causing liability may be broader than aiding and abetting if former only requires
loose causal nexus), Maxey, supra note 12, at 570-71 (maintaining that "contribute" in Section
21C(a) gives SEC room to argue for requiring only "but for" causation), and Lawton &
Botticelli, supra note 19, at 39 (predicting that SEC will find that causing liability does not
require substantial assistance and that secondary actor need not immediately induce violation).
234. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, § 42, at 276-80 (rejecting "fruitless quest for a
universal formula" for proximate cause because concept is fundamentally one of policy, not
fact); Steckman & Conner, supra note 221, at 382-84 (noting disagreement over test for
proximate cause and observing that choice of test is usually outcome determinative).
235. See Lome & Callcott, supra note 19, at 1309 (noting breadth of causing liability
without requirement of substantial assistance).
236. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text (discussing case in which respondent
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Recent administrative decisions highlight this tradeoff in predictability
versus flexibility, as well as the direct and indirect approaches to analyzing
substantial assistance and how the causation standard might differ between
aiding and abetting liability and causing liability. In Sharon M Graham,237 a
case brought jointly under Sections 15(b) and 21 C(a) of the Exchange Act, an
ALJ found that Graham, a registered broker-dealer representative, had will-
fully aided and abetted her customer's market manipulation scheme by reck-
lessly failing to inquire into the propriety of his matched orders before execut-
ing them." The ALJ stated that the substantial assistance element required a
finding that the broker's trades were "a causal factor but not necessarily the
sole factor in bringing about the primary violation."239 The ALJ then noted that
the finding of aiding and abetting necessarily implied a finding of causing
liability, but that even if Graham had not aided and abetted her customer's
violations, she had still caused them under Section 21C(a) by negligence
because she should have known that his actions were illegal. 40 The Commis-
sion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
successfully argued that he was too remote in causal chain to be liable). Courts have long
recognized the concept of legal duty in negligence law as a substitute analysis for proximate
causation and remoteness that perhaps better suggests that the proper inquiry is one of policy,
not physical directness. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, § 42, at 273-75 (noting that duty
test may direct focus toward policy and away from "the mechanical sequence of events which
goes to make up causation in fact"). The SEC decisions are split between the duty and cause
formulations. Compare Albert Glenn Yesner, Initial Decision Release No. 184,75 SEC Docket
220, 257-66 (May 22, 2001) (finding that controller caused company to violate reporting and
recordkeeping provisions by failing in his duty to assess and report accounting practices to audit
committee),final, Exchange Act Release No. 44,452, 75 SEC Docket 648 (June 19,2001), and
Marc N. Geman, Exchange Act Release No. 43,963, 74 SEC Docket 999, 1031-32 (Feb. 14,
2001) (analyzing willful aiding and abetting claims based on reckless inaction in terms of
CEO's "responsibility" for firm's trading strategy), with infra notes 243-54 and accompanying
text (discussing cases using proximate causation tests based on physical remoteness).
237. Sharon M. Graham, Initial Decision Release No. 82, 60 SEC Docket 3162 (Dec. 28,
1995), aff'd, Exchange Act Release No. 40,727, 53 S.E.C. 1072 (1998), aff'd, 222 F.3d 994
(D.C. Cir. 2000). The issue in Graham was whether Sharon Graham had entered orders for
John Broumas to buy and sell the stock of his former company while knowing that another party
had or would execute a "matched order" for the same stock (so that the trading volume of the
stock would increase without a real change in ownership), thereby aiding and abetting
Broumas's Section 10(b) fraud violation. Id. at 3163, 3176-78. An ALJ found that Graham
had knowledge of her involvement in the scheme or at least recklessly failed to inquire about
the propriety of the trades. Id. at 3201-05. The ALJ rejected Graham's defenses of insubstan-
tial assistance and reliance on superiors and found that her aiding and abetting necessarily
implied that she was also a cause of Broumas's violation, thus justifying a cease-and-desist
order. Id. at 3206-07.
238. Id. at3163,3203-05,3212.
239. Id. at 3206-07.
240. Id.
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finned without commenting on the ALJ's dictum regarding the negligence
standard, 41 but the court analyzed the substantial assistance question directly
in terms of action instead of indirectly in terms of causation by focusing on
Graham's discretionary (rather than ministerial) powers over her customer's
account.
242
However, both the Commission and its ALJs appear to prefer using the
causal method of analyzing aiding and abetting. 243 For example, in Warren G.
Trepp,244 an ALJ dismissed charges against a junk bond trader whom the SEC
believed had aided and abetted and caused one of his entity clients to make
material misstatements in its Form 1O-Q and in a filing in anticipation of an
initial public offering.245 Trepp initialed tickets confirming that he had made
trades for the company, but the tickets did not reveal that the trades were part
of a secret "parking" program whereby the company sold bonds to create gains,
but later repurchased them from the broker-dealer at the same price in return
for a fee.246 The company was liable for reporting and fraud violations because
the gains from these trades improperly appeared on its financial statements and
241. See Sharon M. Graham, Exchange Act Release No. 40,727, 53 S.E.C. 1072, 1085
n.35 (1998) (noting that aiding and abetting implies causing, but not analyzing causing liability
claim); see also Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ignoring causing
liability claim altogether).
242. See Graham, 222 F.3d at 1004 (focusing on executing trades as discretionary, not
ministerial, activity).
243. See Russo See., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 39,181, 53 S.E.C. 271, 271-72,
278-82 (1997) (finding that broker-dealer and its principal did not willfully aid and abet or
cause client company to violate Section 10(b) by providing it with sham interest rate reset
opinions for company's bonds to hide noncompliance with indenture agreement because
company never gave those false opinions to anyone, so respondents' acts were not proximate
cause of primary violation in that they did not substantially assist or even contribute to it). But
see Nicholas P. Howard, Initial Decision Release No. 138, 69 SEC Docket 1226, 1243 (Mar.
24, 1999) (analyzing substantial assistance in terms of specific acts without mentioning
causation), aff'd, Exchange Act Release No. 47,357, 2003 SEC LEXIS 377, at *19-21 (Feb.
12, 2003) (same).
244. Warren G. Trepp, Initial Decision Release No. 115, 65 SEC Docket 614 (Aug. 18,
1997), aff'd on other grounds, Exchange Act Release No. 41,913, 70 SEC Docket 2037 (Sept.
24, 1999). Trepp was a junk bond trader whose firm had a secret agreement with Reliance
Group Holdings, Inc. (Reliance) to "park" bonds that Reliance had sold by holding them for
repurchase without market risk in return for a fee. Id. at 623, 626-27, 634-35. Reliance
improperly recognized gains from the sales in violation of GAAP and reported them on its
quarterly and IPO filings in violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(aX2)
of the Securities Act. Id. at 638-40. However, the ALJ found that Trepp had not aided and
abetted or caused these violations by executing the trades because of his "remoteness in the
chain of causation" and lack of knowledge that the purpose of Reliance's trading program was
to create gains. Id.
245. Id. at 638-40, 643.
246. Id. at 626-27, 630, 634-35.
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filings. 241 As for Trepp, the ALJ found that he (1) had not aided and abetted the
company's violations because the SEC had not proven substantial assistance
given Trepp's "remoteness in the chain of causation," which necessitated a
finding of knowledge that he lacked, and (2) had not caused the violations
based solely on the remoteness rationale. 24 The chain of the company report-
ing Trepp's trades on its financial statements, which it then incorporated into
its SEC filings, was apparently too indirect to support a finding of proximate
causation because Trepp did not know that the program's purpose was to create
gains to appear on SEC filings, despite his knowing that his trades would
appear in the company's financial statements.249
To see how unpredictable the concept of proximate cause can be, com-
pare Trepp with Robert G. Weeks,2s0 a case in which the Division of Enforce-
ment alleged that three men who controlled a virtual shell corporation had
caused the company to violate the Section 13 reporting provisions of the
Exchange Act by filing late annual and quarterly reports with the SEC and
failing to file current reports. 21 After citing conflicting cases on the meaning
of "cause" from other securities law contexts and the newly adopted negli-
gence standard for causing liability from KPMG,252 the ALJ found that the
respondents had caused the violation by "creating the predicament" that
resulted in the violation.253 Specifically, they had diverted so much money
from the company that it could not pay its auditors, who therefore would not
prepare the financial statements, which the company thus could not file
247. Id. at 638-40.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Robert 0. Weeks, Initial Decision Release No. 199, 76 SEC Docket 2609 (Feb. 4,
2002). In Weeks, an AIJ found that three men who controlled the nominal officers and
directors of a shell corporation, Dynamic American Corp. (Dynamic), had violated the securities
laws by selling unregistered Dynamic stock based on materially misleading statements that
inflated the company's mining assets. Id. at 2609-10. The ALJ further found that the respon-
dents had negligently caused Dynamic to file late Forms 10-K and 10-Q, to fail to file Form 8-
K, and to fail to maintain expense records by "creating the predicament that resulted in Dynamic
American's violations." Id. at 2659-61. Specifically, the respondents had diverted the funds
from Dynamic's illegal stock sales so that the company could not pay its auditors and therefore
could not create or file financial statements. Id. at 2660. They also refused to provide the
nominal officers with sufficient information to establish an adequate records system. Id.
251. Id. at 2610, 2659-61.
252. See id. at 2659 (citing Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding
that conduct that is "cause" of violation must consist of more than merely conduct that has "to
some degree been a factor"); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1952)
(rejecting contention that courts must always interpret "cause" to mean "an immediate or
inducing cause")); supra Part III.E. I (discussing KPMG).
253. Weeks, 76 SEC Docket at 2660.
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promptly with the SEC.254 This causation chain is no less attenuated than the
one in Trepp, yet the results are opposite.
Given the unpredictability of proximate causation, should causing
liability require only factual causation? At least one ALJ appears to concur
with this view.255 Furthermore, this treatment of causing liability would be
consistent with its mental state and act requirements, which are also lower
than those for aiding and abetting liability."6
Nevertheless, one can imagine the SEC trying to establish even more
tenuous causation chains than those in Trepp and Weeks if causing liability
only required factual causation. And while Trepp and Weeks are arguably
inconsistent and neither explicitly referred to proximate causation per se, the
ALJs in both cases seemed to rely on proximate causation arguments to
support their conclusions.257 Moreover, policy arguments aside, Congress
imported the "cause" language in Section 21 C(a) from Section 1 5(c)(4),258 and
presumably before that from tort and criminal law,2"9 which provide the
foundation for most securities law secondary liability theories, including
aiding and abetting.2c Because those sources of law require proximate
254. Id.
255. See Jeffrey M. Steinberg, Initial Decision Release No. 196, 76 SEC Docket 1538,
1583 (Dec. 20, 2001) (applying KPMG negligence standard and accepting Enforcement
Division's argument that causing liability did not require proximate causation). However, the
ALJ in Steinberg hedged slightly by saying that "it is incorrect to assert that any act which
contributes to the violation is a 'cause' of that violation." Id. at 1583-84. Furthermore, the ALJ
had just quoted a passage discussing the importance of determining the meaning of "cause" on
a case-by-case basis by means of discretion and policy, which seems to belie his assertion that
causing liability requires only "but for" causation. Id. at 1583.
256. See supra Part M.E.1-2 (defining mental state and act requirements).
257. Compare Robert 0. Weeks, Initial Decision Release No. 199, 76 SEC Docket 2609,
2659-61 (Feb. 4, 2002) (finding sufficient causation where secondary offender "created the
predicament" resulting in primary violation) with Warren 0. Trepp, Initial Decision Release No.
115, 65 SEC Docket 614, 638-40 (Aug. 18, 1997) (finding insufficient causation based on
respondent's lack of knowledge and his remoteness in chain of causation), aff'd on other
grounds, Exchange Act Release No. 41,913, 70 SEC Docket 2037 (Sept. 24, 1999).
258. See supra notes 69-70, 88-89, and accompanying text (noting that Congress imported
causing liability language from Section 15(cX4) and that SEC informally agreed that causation
in that statute meant proximate causation).
259. See Doty, supra note 119, at 604 (recognizing "tort-based concepts which inhabit the
causation cabinets of the common law"); Hansen, supra note 3, at 346 (arguing that causing
liability should require proximate causation because "the concept of being a 'cause' of a
violation presumably imports at least the notion of 'proximate' cause from negligence law").
260. See Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511 U.S.
164, 181 (1994) (noting tort and criminal law foundations of aiding and abetting); Goodwin,
supra note 18, at 1411, 1417 (noting tort basis for conspiracy and respondeat superior).
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causation in most circumstances,26' the textualist rationale of Central Bank
militates in favor of a proximate causation requirement for causing liability.262
Courts should so hold, thereby giving effect to presumed congressional intent,
but still permitting ALJs to approach causing liability cases with flexibility
by raising or lowering the amount of indirectness that they will accept as
establishing proximate cause on a case-by-case basis and as policy concerns
dictate.
IV Conclusion
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission took more than a
decade to define one of the most basic elements of causing liability, at least it
eventually did so correctly. The Commission's interpretation of causing
liability as requiring only negligence is firmly grounded in the statutory text
and remedial structure of the Remedies Act and is consistent with the history
of causing liability under Section 15(c)(4) and a lesser "likelihood" showing
for cease-and-desist orders. The textualist reasoning of Central Bank worked
in the SEC's favor this time, and the D.C. Circuit rightly deferred to the
Commission's judgment and affirmed KPMG.
Nevertheless, some basic issues regarding causing liability remain unre-
solved, and this Note suggests several solutions. First, the Commission should
clarify its holding in KPMG by overruling the prevailing view among the ALJs
regarding causing liability in cases of primary violations requiring scienter.
The Commission should hold that both natural persons and business entities
can negligently cause other natural persons and business entities to violate
securities statutes that require scienter, except in cases in which no natural
person exists who can supply the entity with the requisite scienter to commit
the primary violation. By prohibiting negligent causing liability in all cases
involving scienter-based primary violations, the current rule is overbroad and
contravenes the statutory text that created causing liability.
Second, the Commission and courts should formally recognize that the act
requirement for causing liability is easier to establish than that for aiding and
abetting because the former expressly includes omissions. This pronounce-
261. SeeMODELPENALCODEANDCOmmENTARES,supra note 195, § 2.03(1)(a) (requiring
"but for" causation and any additional causation requirements imposed by law); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 94, §§ 430-33 (establishing legal causation requirement for
negligence); KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, §§ 41-42, at 263-80 (explaining proximate
causation requirement for negligence).
262. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) ("It is a well-established rule of
construction that '[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under...
the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means
to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.'" (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989))).
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ment might also help courts resolve the longstanding question of whether
inaction can support aiding and abetting liability at all. Finally, the Commis-
sion should hold that causing liability, like aiding and abetting liability, re-
quires proximate causation. A proximate causation requirement would parallel
and reinforce the Steadman factors and the prosecutorial discretion of the SEC
in the crucial function of saving peripheral defendants from the textually
expansive reach of causing liability in appropriate cases. This requirement is
notjust good policy, either. Rather, the statutory text of Section 21 C(a) nearly
commands it because a requirement of proximate causation has traditionally
accompanied the negligence standard in tort law.
Although this Note has attempted to define causing liability, the future of
causing liability will largely depend not on how the SEC defines it, but on how
the SEC uses it. Causing liability is expansive on its face and applies to all
persons and to all securities law violations. This secondary liability theory is
certainly broader than aiding and abetting liability because it has lower act and
mental state thresholds.
Nevertheless, for various policy reasons and as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, the SEC very well may decline to exercise the full extent of its
authority to reach secondary violators of the securities laws via causing liabil-
ity. The SEC will likely continue to use cease-and-desist orders based on
causing liability to supplement the other remedies available against securities
professionals for willful aiding and abetting, and perhaps even use it as an end
run around the high hurdles of the aiding and abetting standard in those cases.
However, in light of the SEC's loss of most of its secondary liability arsenal
after Central Bank, the Commission also could decide to extend causing
liability into more generic securities fraud situations, especially when proof of
scienter is unavailable or when the fraudulent scheme involves negligent
peripheral actors. Indeed, the recent scandals in corporate America may
provide added incentive to use causing liability as the vanguard to regain the
ground lost in the battle of Central Bank. Although a cease-and-desist order
based on causing liability is obviously much too light a penalty for massive
corporate financial fraud, causing liability could become a useful preventive
tool by announcing standards of conduct and stopping relatively small errors
from escalating into a culture of corruption.
By beginning to define the elements of causing liability, the SEC solidi-
fied a long overlooked weapon in its enforcement arsenal. By continuing its
nascent efforts at a basic definition, the SEC could complete the transformation
of causing liability into a distinct and legitimate form of secondary liability
with unparalleled expansiveness. Still, the securities world can only hope that
the Commission will not wait another ten years to define the next element of
causing liability.

